Do Enclaves Remediate Social Inequality?

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Do women benefit from participating in women-only, "enclave" groups? Specifically, do such groups benefit their individual members? This question underlies a number of influential normative theories of inequality but remains underexplored despite the ubiquity of these groups in the organizational life of legislative, party, civic, education, and interest-group settings. This article develops multiple objective and subjective dimensions of individual empowerment that such groups may produce, specifies the institutional conditions that facilitate these benefits, and conducts a comparison with men's groups. To address selection effects, we use a controlled experiment randomizing gender composition and other group characteristics. We find that female enclaves benefit their members, but only under unanimous rule and for most, but not all, forms of empowerment. Men-only groups do not help men, suggesting that enclaves work because they empower the powerless.

All-female groups have a long-standing and ongoing presence in many areas of American political and civic life. A large majority of women who hold local and state political office belong to all-female groups (Carroll 2006, 365; Crowder-Meyer 2010). Every female US House member has joined the House Women's Caucus, and all female senators meet monthly without men.[1] The Democratic Party's official women's caucus draws more delegates than other caucuses (Masket, Heaney, and Strolovitch 2014, 265). Both in the United States and around the world, women are more likely to belong to women's groups than to political, professional, or community organizations (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001; Norris and Inglehart 2006). Globally, there are over 50 women's parties (Cowell-Meyers 2014, 2016), and 15 of 17 advanced democracies have them (Childs and Kittilson 2016). Women's organizations outside of government are the principal way that women successfully mobilize to secure legal protections (Htun and Weldon 2012; Weldon 2011). Put simply, all-female groups are numerous, active, and significant in politics.

However, while scholars have studied these groups' structures and strategies and documented their consequences for policies or institutions, little attention has been devoted to their internal processes. This article focuses on the internal dynamics of all-female groups, as compared to groups where women predominate but men are still present. Do all-female groups operate differently because they are all female? Specifically, do women in such groups interact in ways that boost female members' motivation and belief in their capacity to exercise influence, empowering them to advocate for more ambitious policy change?

We argue that the all-female composition of women's groups, and their unique social dynamic, is not a peripheral aspect of women's political organization. Rather, it is a core element of such groups and a key way in which they can empower their members. All-female groups may be uniquely positioned to empower women not only by providing concrete resources such as information or funding but also by shaping their members' interactions with each other in ways that change gender norms, building female members' author-

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1. For the House, see http://www.thenewagenda.net/2010/06/06/congressional-caucus-for-womens-issues-interview-with-president-of-wpi/. On the Senate, see http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/22/us/politics/women-make-new-gains-in-the-senate.html?pagewanted=all.

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itative influence and thus inviting them to envision significant policy change. All-female groups may create more efficacious female members who take action to advocate for more ambitious goals, thereby helping to achieve policies that benefit women in society. In this sense, all-female groups are distinct even from majority-female groups. In short, they function as enclaves.[2]

We develop, and systematically test, a theory of enclaves using five novel features. First, we randomly assign women to all-female groups. Previous work has been unable to disentangle the effects of gendered enclaves from other factors correlated with membership in an all-female group. Random assignment addresses this problem. Second, we use the closest comparison as the baseline: female-majority groups. This isolates the effects of all-female composition itself. Third, we examine enclave effects on a diverse array of measures of empowerment, including actual behavior in real time. We construct these measures from our observations of small groups as they discuss and choose policy related to redistribution. Fourth, we test how procedural rules condition enclaves' success. Fifth, we conduct a placebo test on men in men's groups, to see whether enclaves specifically benefit women as a disadvantaged group.

These five features represent both a theoretical and empirical advance. Burns et al. (2001) found an association between membership in all-female civic groups and participatory skills using national survey data but did not develop a full theory of enclaves or use the set of methodological elements listed above. Karpowitz and Mendelberg (2014) broadly gestured at, but did not fully develop, a theory of identity enclaves. Furthermore, their empirical results concentrated heavily on mixed-gender groups, not enclaves: for example, they did not include formal tests of enclaves against the appropriate comparison groups, nor did they examine a full array of enclave outcomes or how enclave effects may differ by decision rule, nor did they compare male and female enclaves. To our knowledge, the current study represents the first rigorous, in-depth examination of the internal processes and outcomes of gender enclaves.

In controlled experiments, strong internal validity can reduce external validity. Nevertheless, our basic finding—that enclaves can uniquely empower women and cause them to aim for dramatically different policy—is in line with observational studies of political groups, as we elaborate below. In the conclusion, we cautiously generalize to the kinds of groups that motivate the research question: interest and civic groups, party activists, and legislators.

ENCLAVES ARE UBIQUITOUS, BUT THEIR DISTINCTIVE DYNAMICS AND EFFECTS ARE UNCLEAR

All-female groups are core elements of civic and political life (Cowell-Meyers 2014; Skocpol 1999, 468–72), but scholars know little about their internal dynamics. For example, Masket et al. conclude that Democratic Party caucuses "are spaces for building solidarity within marginalized groups" (2014, 274). However, that study does not investigate how caucuses build solidarity, whether caucuses have effects that cannot be explained by the characteristics of those who join them, or whether caucus effects obtain because caucuses are homogeneous. More generally, research on women's movements and interest or civic groups investigates the structure, external strategies, and policy consequences of all-female groups but has yet to unpack how group functions differ specifically because of their gender composition or how their internal group processes empower their members (Goss 2013; Skocpol 1995; Weldon 2011).

Still, case studies of all-female groups hint that meeting dynamics orient toward mutual affirmation of members' capacity and status. Polletta suggests that 1960s women's groups empowered women by creating a supportive interaction dynamic (2002, 149). Katzenstein's study of patriarchal institutions found that women formed enclaves emphasizing equal status and participation at meetings (1990, 42). Building on these important works, we ask what transpires when members interact, what enclaves do for their own members' efficacy and sense of authority, and whether they prompt members to amplify their efforts and voice more ambitious policy goals because the groups were composed entirely of women. In sum, all-female groups may affect the outputs of politics and civil society. The question is how such groups create authoritative advocates out of disempowered members.

THE UNKNOWN PROMISE OF WOMEN'S ENCLAVES IN SOCIETY

Political and civic groups are not the only setting where women's groups exist, and political science is not alone in assuming they are important. In several scholarly fields, the interest in—and call for—women-only spaces has been quite clear. Although there is more theorizing in these fields about the internal dynamics of interaction within the group, and better recognition of the need to build women up from a psychological state of relative disempowerment, the data are sparse and the evidence limited methodologically.

2. Whether women-only groups succeed in representing intersectional identities is an important question in itself (Reagon 1983; Strolovitch 2007; Weldon 2011).

For example, Ely, Ibarra, and Klob's study of leadership programs argues that developing women's capacity requires transitioning women's identity from nonleaders to leaders via a "safe space for learning and experimentation and building a community of peer support" (2011, 486). The all-female nature of these groups is said to be crucial because the presence of men may remind women of the gendered prohibition against leadership (Eagly and Carli 2007).

Similar hypotheses show up for educational settings, where the number of single-sex public schools and classes has increased sharply since the No Child Left Behind Act (Bigler, Hayes, and Liben 2014, 228). Among the arguments for single-sex settings is that girls benefit by avoiding boys' relative assertiveness, for example, in "monopolizing the linguistic space" (Salamone 2006, 790; Basow 2010; Hayes, Pahlke, and Bigler 2011). Girls may also benefit from single-sex settings because the presence of a male may trigger a reluctance to violate feminine roles (Booth and Nolen 2012; Gneezy, Niederle, and Rustichini 2003) or activate stereotypes of girls as less competent (Ridgeway 1982). An influential review found single-sex classrooms had a positive effect on girls' academic performance and efficacy (Mael et al. 2005).

This literature builds a good case for expecting that all-female groups empower women by removing members with an authoritative social identity (namely, men) from social interaction, fostering communication dynamics that support women's sense of inherent worth. That process may motivate women to advocate for their priorities with concrete, ambitious goals.

However, because families generally opt into single-sex classrooms, their effects may be due to students differing from the start or to other confounding variables correlated with all-female settings. Few studies use random assignment (Mael et al. 2005). The few that do so, in educational and other settings, fail to provide clear evidence for the effects of all-female groups (Halpern et al. 2011; Hoxby 2000; Pahlke, Hyde, and Allison 2014; Signorella, Hayes, and Li 2013; Smith-Lovin and Brody 1989; Whitmore 2005).

The randomized studies of enclaves are themselves open to methodological critique. In several studies, the number of groups is small (Aries 1976; Thomas-Hunt and Phillips 2004). The mixed-gender "control" condition, if it exists, differs from the all-female condition by including anywhere from a majority of women to a majority of men (Hysom and Johnson 2006; Johnson, Clay-Warner, and Funk 1996; Mast 2001; Ridgeway and Diekema 1989; Shelly and Munroe 1999; Walker et al. 1996). The only randomized study we have found that used the appropriate baseline was conducted by Johnson and Schulman (1989). However, that study relied exclusively on member ratings of other members rather than adding objective measures of participation or influence. No study uses an array of subjective and objective measures of empowerment.

In sum, studies of all-female groups would benefit from random assignment to composition, more groups, a majority-female baseline in which the only difference with all-women groups is the presence of men, and more diverse measures of empowerment. We build these features into the current study.

ENCLAVE EFFECTS MAY BE CONDITIONED BY PROCEDURAL RULES AND NORMS

Enclaves may not benefit all types of decision-making groups equally. The benefits of enclaves may be concentrated among groups that adopt particular procedural rules. Mansbridge (1983; see also Gastil 2014) argues that procedures have far-reaching effects beyond aggregating preferences. Specifically, unanimous rule sets in motion a consensus-oriented discussion that implicitly signals that each member matters. By contrast, majority rule prompts an implicit understanding that conflict is acceptable and inevitable and that the majority—whoever it is—gets to set the terms and style of debate. Rules thus shape not only how preferences are counted but also the social norms that emerge as the group interacts.

Rule-produced norms affect how much authority women have in mixed-gender groups: majority rule tends to empower the gender majority, while unanimous rule will tend to empower the gender minority (Karpowitz and Mendelberg 2014). This means that majority rule will equalize women's power when they are a majority, but unanimous rule will fail to do so because it empowers the male minority. In Williams's words, veto power "may be wielded by any hands" (2000, 227), and when men are the minority, they may tend to leverage that power in ways that disadvantage women.

This argument has implications for enclaves that existing work (e.g., Karpowitz and Mendelberg 2014) has yet to articulate or test. Specifically, under majority rule and its norms, enclaves may not be necessary because women are already empowered by large numbers. Under these conditions, women obtain equality with men without requiring the complete absence of men, suggesting that enclaves do little that majority-female groups do not. But when women are the numerical majority in groups deciding by unanimity, unanimous rule signals power for the male minority. Men tend to use that power for disproportionate influence. For these reasons, we expect that only under unanimous rule will enclaves make a difference.

A THEORY OF ENCLAVES

Putting these strands together, we arrive at a theory of enclaves. In groups consisting entirely of their own members,

disadvantaged individuals may be best able to develop a sense of their own capacity and come to articulate their own perspectives and preferences. There, they are not undermined by more advantaged individuals who are perceived to be more competent in public affairs, who tend to play a dominant role and carry disproportionate influence beyond their numbers during the discussion, or who may inhibit the full participation and influence of disadvantaged individuals (Babcock et al. 2003; Basow 2010; Eagly and Carli 2007; Gneezy et al. 2003; Ridgeway 1982). In such enclaves, women may provide each other with mutual psychological support, further enhancing their personal empowerment. Women may focus on their distinctive concerns as women, giving them the autonomy to prioritize issues that may otherwise be shunted aside. Finally, women can witness the concrete influence they wield over a collective decision by exercising their individual voice. In other words, our theory of enclaves expects that all-female groups will positively affect the women who enter them, creating a more supportive style of interaction among women, a heightened sense of self-efficacy, higher stores of perceived influence in the eyes of others, greater emphasis on issues of particular concern to women, and perhaps most important, stronger advocacy for concrete policy measures that address those concerns. In short, enclaves can help women come to see themselves as authoritative participants. As a result of these forms of empowerment, women in enclaves may ultimately produce different policy outcomes.

The final element in our theory is that the benefits of enclaves may only manifest when the nearest alternative—groups with a few men—produces high gender inequality. That is, women may do just as well in groups where they are the majority of members compared to groups where they are the only members. Whether female majorities empower women is likely conditional on the group's procedures. Some procedures—majority rule, especially—are likely to empower female majorities. Under those procedures, women may not need to exclude men. Institutional rules may affect empowerment and are thus a key contingency of enclaves. By implication, altering the institutional rules can affect which norms are constructed and how well those norms empower disadvantaged social identities.

Our predictions are, first, compared with majority-female groups, enclaves empower women under unanimous rule but not majority rule. Second, because men have not been socialized to lower levels of authority and tend to have higher levels of confidence generally, enclaves are not expected to empower men under either decision rule. These hypotheses have not been articulated or tested in the literature and represent a contribution of this study.

MEASURES OF EMPOWERMENT

Given these theoretical expectations, we develop measures of the various ways that enclaves might empower women. We test all of them in one study in order to comprehensively assess the types of authority that enclaves are expected to affect. What is said to distinguish enclaves is that they increase women's likelihood of engaging in a range of significant acts of participation and provide to them a qualitatively different, more supportive experience that elevates their authority and influence. We elaborate each of these distinctive measures of participation and influence below. For full details of variable construction, see the online appendix, pages 1–2.

First, we measure the patterns of positive and negative interruptions received by women from women. How members of a group interact with each other—the verbal and nonverbal cues they send—can either enhance or detract from women's authority, and interruptions are an especially powerful signal (Smith-Lovin and Brody 1989). Negative interruptions assert dominance and signal disagreement or even hostility, thus detracting from the speaker's authority. Women are more likely than men to interpret negative signals or expressions of disagreement as indicators of their low authority (Anderson and Leaper 1998; Li 2001). By contrast, positive interruptions signal warmth, support, agreement, and rapport among group members, thus building the authority of the speaker. Women may especially benefit from such signals. Counting the negative and positive interruptions received by each woman allows us to directly observe how group interaction detracts from or builds women's authority.

Second, the theory of enclaves holds that all-female groups may be especially valuable for women in building a sense of themselves as active, effective, successful participants in collective decisions. Whether because of the absence of comparisons with men or a greater sense of group rapport and support, our theory predicts that the all-female group dynamic should elevate women's sense of efficacy. We measured a woman's sense of her ability to participate authoritatively in group discussion with two self-reports: her belief about her own influence and her sense that her "voice was heard" during the discussion.

Third, enclave effects may bolster women's trust in their own preferences and their efforts and success in voicing them. Women are less likely than men to believe that their views are worthwhile (Kling et al. 1999). One theorized benefit of enclaves is that they may help women develop or clarify their own, authentic preferences. After the group discussion, we asked each participant how sure she was of her preferences. While having clear preferences is a first step to empowerment, we also move beyond self-reported opinions by measuring the preferences women actually articulated during deliberation,

as well as the group decision. This set of variables provides a window into how enclaves might encourage women to develop and effectively express their preferences, certifying women's authority.

A fourth measure of empowerment in enclaves focuses on women's ability to set the group's agenda by turning the conversation to issues of distinctive concern to women (see online appendix pp. 3–5). Because of gender role socialization and occupational segmentation, survey and other evidence shows that government assistance for children, family, the needy, and the poor tends to be more important to women than to men (Crowder-Meyer 2007). For the same reason, men tend to prioritize issues of finance (Karpowitz and Mendelberg 2014). An element of women's empowerment would therefore consist of women increasing their frequency of talking about issues particularly important to women (care issues) and decreasing their discussion of issues particularly important to men (financial issues).

A fifth facet of empowerment is participation in the interaction. Enclaves may empower women by prompting them to speak up and engage in the conversation more fully. This is an important form of political action (Burns et al. 2001). Talk times are more than chattiness: those who hold the floor for a greater proportion of a group's discussion time are more likely to be judged by other participants as the group's most influential member (Karpowitz and Mendelberg 2014). Thus, we examine talk time and the perceived influence it generates.

A final measure of empowerment is evaluations of the group. We evaluate whether women in enclaves give higher assessments of the fairness, equality, and quality of discussion (see appendix pp. 2–3). The argument for enclaves suggests that women should find the experience of making decisions among themselves more satisfying and empowering. However, an important argument against enclaves is that they may shortchange the quality and thoroughness of discussion.

WOMEN'S ENCLAVES: AN EXPERIMENTAL TEST

A controlled experiment prevents self-selection into enclaves or into procedures that shape group norms, preempting these as a confounding cause of enclave effects. It also allows us to construct the key theoretical point of contrast for enclaves: the presence of a small number of men. We randomly assigned participants to groups and groups to decision rules. Data are drawn from a larger project, full details of which are reported in Karpowitz and Mendelberg (2014). The full experiment was a 6×2 factorial design, with groups that varied by gender composition (0–5 women) and decision rule (majority or unanimity). Randomization checks show that groups were balanced with respect to relevant characteristics (see table A1; tables A1–A11 are available online).

Community members and students at two different sites were recruited through on-campus and online announcements as well as assistance from local community groups to be part of a study about "how people make decisions about important issues." Participants were not allowed to be part of the same groups if they knew each other before the experimental session. After arriving at the lab, participants were told that, later in the experiment, they would be doing a task to earn money. Participants were not informed about what the task would be, only that some of them were likely to do well and others would do poorly. Individuals then privately answered questions about their political and social views, their sense of confidence in participating in group discussions, and other measures of individual characteristics. They were introduced to principles of income redistribution, such as not imposing any taxes or providing a safety net for the poor with an associated tax levied for that purpose.

Experimenters then brought participants together in groups of five for face-to-face group deliberation, instructing participants to have a "full and open discussion" about how they would redistribute their earnings, if at all. They were to choose a principle of redistribution for their group that would also apply, hypothetically, to society at large. Groups were required to talk for a minimum of five minutes, but the average group deliberated for 25 minutes, indicating that groups engaged the issues at more than a superficial level. If groups chose to redistribute earnings, thereby establishing a safety net, they had to choose how generous the minimum guaranteed income for each group member would be (and thus how much high earners in the group would be taxed). Voting occurred by secret ballot according to the randomly assigned decision rule. After the group decision, participants returned to their individual cubicles to privately answer questions about their impressions of the deliberation and the group. They then completed the earnings task (correcting spelling errors in a sample text) and were paid according to the redistributive rule chosen by the group.

Our interest is in the difference between female enclaves and groups with many women, so our focus is on 139 women and 16 men in 31 groups containing either four or five women. The sample varied in its demographic characteristics, including age, student status, income, and social and political views (see table A2 for descriptive statistics), although all participants were non-Hispanic whites. We conducted robustness checks on the larger, pooled three- and four-female groups as a baseline (online appendix pp. 9–10).

We report ordinary least squares regression results for each of the dependent variables described above. The key independent variable is a dichotomous indicator of whether the participant was assigned to an enclave group. Random

assignment means that controls are unnecessary, except for an indicator for experimental site. Because women are expected to gain rather than lose empowerment in enclaves, we use one-tailed tests. Individual-level observations are nested within groups, so we report cluster robust standard errors.

Our analytical strategy involves three distinct models. First, we present the effect of enclaves on women with no controls other than an indicator for experimental site. Second, we control for a competing element of the group's composition that is relevant to redistribution: the number of egalitarians in the group. We count the number of individuals scoring above the midpoint on a standard egalitarianism scale (Feldman 1987) measured before deliberation (online appendix p. 1). This control addresses the possibility that enclave effects are due to the distribution of preferences in the group rather than to women's authority gap with men. We examine the effects of enclaves in both the simple model and the model with controls for the number of egalitarians separately by decision rule. Third and finally, we conduct a formal test of the difference in differences in enclave effects across decision rules.

HOW ENCLAVES AFFECT WOMEN'S EMPOWERMENT

Interruptions

We begin with the question of how enclaves affect the support and affirmation women receive from other members. Following Karpowitz and Mendelberg (2014), we coded all interruptions as positive, negative, or neutral. Positive interruptions express solidarity and support ("yeah," "I agree"). Negative interruptions express disapproval ("but," "no," "I disagree") or change the subject. We measured positive interruptions by the positively interrupted share of a woman's total speaking turns. Because negative interruptions occurred comparatively less often, we measured their frequency with the negative share of the interruptions a woman received, to avoid a skewed indicator.[3] We focused on interruptions issued to women by women, in order to hold the dependent variable constant across enclaves and control groups. However, findings replicate when male-issued interruptions were included (available from authors).

Table 1 shows that enclaves provide more positive and less negative feedback to women, but only with a consensus-oriented discussion norm. Specifically, under unanimous rule, women received more positive interruptions in enclaves, even when controlling for the number of egalitarians in the group (models 1 and 2). Enclaves also reduced negative interruptions, marginally ($p = .06$ and $p = .08$ in models 3 and 4). However, under majority rule, enclaves differed little from groups with four women (models 5–8). For both interruptions measures, the enclave effect in majority-rule groups was small and did not come close to statistical significance.

Self-efficacy

Did women register these supportive signals? To find out, we analyzed women's postdeliberation belief that their "opinions were influential" in shaping group discussion and decisions and that their "voice was heard" during the discussion. In unanimous rule groups, enclaves carried no significant effect on self-perceived influence on group decisions (table 2, models 1 and 2) but did exert a large effect on respondents' beliefs that their voices were heard (models 3 and 4). On this measure, enclaves increased women's efficacy by more than half of a standard deviation. By contrast, in groups assigned to majority rule, the effects on both measures of self-efficacy were much smaller and not statistically significant (models 5–8).

Effectiveness in implementing preferences

Increased self-efficacy and positive feedback in enclaves may be accompanied by other forms of increased empowerment. After the discussion, participants were asked how certain they were about their private preferences about the redistributive principles. Table 3 suggests that consistent with their increased self-efficacy, women in enclaves emerged from the discussion surer of their opinions ($p = .06$ in model 1 and $p = .05$ model 2). Unanimous enclaves thus empowered women by reassuring them that their voice—and opinion—was worthy of a hearing.

Women tend to prefer more generous provision for the least well off, so an important test of women's empowerment is to see whether women express this preference more often in enclaves. Consistent with this expectation, in enclaves, women advocated for over $10,000 more in yearly aid to the least well off individuals (table 3, models 3 and 4; fig. 1, *left panel*). At the time of the study, the poverty line for a family of four was about $21,000, so the enclave effect represents a substantively meaningful increase of almost half the effective guaranteed minimum income. Finally, enclaves again made no difference under majority rule (models 7–10).

When women exercised this voice for generosity, the group acted accordingly. Under unanimous rule, enclaves set a safety net that was $11,000/year more generous to the poor (models 5 and 6). The decision is commensurate with women's expressed preferences (fig. 1, *right panel*). That is, when women spoke up, the group listened and changed its outcome. Because enclaves empowered women to voice their

3. When the dependent variable is the negative share of interruptions received, the number of observations is lower because some received no interruptions, so the negative share is undefined.

Table 1. Interruptions Received by Women from Women

	Unanimous				Majority			
	Proportion of Speaking Turns with Positive Interruption		Proportion of Interruptions That Are Negative		Proportion of Speaking Turns with Positive Interruption		Proportion of Interruptions That Are Negative	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Enclave	.01**	.01**	−.18*	−.16*	.003	−.00001	.01	.02
	(.01)	(.01)	(.11)	(.11)	(.01)	(.01)	(.10)	(.10)
Number of egalitarians		−.003		.07		−.003		.02
		(.004)		(.07)		(.002)		(.03)
Constant	.02**	.03**	.46**	.29*	.02**	.03**	.35**	.29**
	(.005)	(.01)	(.10)	(.19)	(.01)	(.01)	(.10)	(.14)
Observations	67	67	53	53	72	72	64	64
R^2	.16	.17	.11	.16	.01	.03	.002	.01

Note. For the proportion of negative interruptions dependent variable, the denominator is the total number of all negative or positive interruptions received (neutral interruptions excluded); the numerator is the number of negative interruptions received. These numbers are based on the average dyadic proportion received by each member of the group. We defined interruptions as an overlap in speaking between two participants of at least 0.5 seconds. Observations for the negative interruptions measure are lower because some participants received no interruptions at all. Cell entries are ordinary least squares regression coefficients; cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by group); significance tests are one-tailed. All regressions include a control for experimental location (not shown).

* $p < .10$.

** $p < .05$.

more generous preferences, they resulted in a more generous decision. By contrast, under majority rule, enclaves made no difference to the decision, as women voiced generous preferences even when a man was present (models 11 and 12).

Issue agenda

Given women's more vigorous advocacy for a generous social safety net, perhaps women also set the issue agenda in enclaves by talking about the poor and related concerns more often. According to previous studies, the needs of vulnerable populations tend to be of distinctive concern to women, as a result of gender role expectations. This is a set of policy domains sometimes labeled as "care issues," dealing with children, family, the poor, or the needy. We examined the frequency with which women talked about these topics (in words per 1,000; see appendix pp. 3–5). Although the coefficients are in the expected direction in unanimous rule groups, table 4 shows that enclaves exerted no significant effect under either decision rule. This null effect may stem partly from the fact that baseline groups spoke about care issues at a high rate already—more than 10 words per 1,000 (and more than 90% of women mentioned the issues at least once) under unanimous rule (models 1 and 2) and even more frequently under majority rule (models 5 and 6). Similarly, enclaves had little effect on women's talk of finances, a distinctively masculine domain (table 4, models 3, 4, 7, and 8). Thus, the issue agenda was not substantially different in enclaves. Regarding this form of empowerment, the enclave hypothesis fails.

Talk time and the perceived influence it generates

An additional measure of empowerment is the amount of speech. As mentioned above, this is a consequential form of participation that strongly shapes perceptions of influence. Did enclaves empower women to speak more, gaining influence by holding the floor? In enclaves, women were the only speakers, so the average woman's Proportion Talk in the group of five members was .20, by definition. Table 5 shows that under unanimous rule, such equality is a distinct benefit of enclaves. In the baseline majority-female groups, the proportion decreased by .02, to .18 (in models 1 and 2). Summed across female members, this result means that even though women made up 80% of the group, they accounted for about 70% of the talk. Put differently, the lone males in these unanimous groups held the floor for a disproportionate amount of time. On average, then, women in unanimous groups with one man did not achieve an equal share of the conversation. By contrast, under majority rule, enclaves had no effect (models 5 and 6); whether a man was present or not, the average

Table 2. Self-Efficacy

	Unanimous				Majority			
	Opinions Influential		Voice Heard		Opinions Influential		Voice Heard	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Enclave	.04	.04	.12**	.12**	.03	.02	.01	.01
	(.05)	(.04)	(.04)	(.03)	(.05)	(.04)	(.03)	(.03)
Number of Egalitarians		.03		−.02*		−.02		.004
		(.03)		(.01)		(.02)		(.01)
Constant	.63**	.57**	.68**	.73**	.57**	.63**	.79**	.77**
	(.03)	(.06)	(.02)	(.04)	(.04)	(.07)	(.04)	(.04)
Observations	67	67	67	67	72	72	72	72
R^2	.01	.03	.08	.09	.02	.02	.001	.002

Note. Cell entries are ordinary least squares regression coefficients; cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by group); significance tests are one-tailed. All regressions include a control for experimental location (not shown).

* $p < .10$.

** $p < .05$.

woman accounted for about 20% of the conversation—nearly perfect equality of speaking time for members of a five-person group. Under unanimity, enclaves empowered women by removing men who monopolized the conversation. Under majority rule, men and women already divided the conversation equally, so enclaves offered no additional gain.

A key to empowerment is perceived authority. Among the questions we asked each member in private after deliberation was which member of the group was the "most influential." We counted only "votes" received from other members. Because floor time has been found to be strongly associated with influence, we expected that just as unanimity enclaves raise women's share of the conversation, they also increase their influence. This expectation is confirmed in table 5. Under unanimity, women received more influence votes in enclaves (models 3 and 4).[4] Again, the dynamic was quite different in majority-rule groups. Here, men did not monopolize the conversation when they were present, women already had an equal share of the conversation, and thus, enclaves provided them with no gain in influence (models 7 and 8).[5]

Satisfaction with the group

Finally, we turn to the question of whether the increased empowerment associated with enclaves left women feeling more satisfied with their groups. After the discussion ended, we asked each member a battery of 12 questions designed to evaluate their group experience (see online appendix pp. 2–3 for details). Factor analysis indicated that these questions were clustered along four dimensions. The first is the extent to which group work helped participants to accomplish more or less (Accomplish). The second measures the extent to which "a few people dominated the discussion" (Few Dominated). The third variable is the participant's sense that the group discussion was fair, inclusive, and satisfying (Satisfaction). The fourth taps an element of high-quality deliberation—whether members fully considered the options (Full Deliberation). Table 6 shows that enclaves had little effect on these assessments under either decision rule, perhaps because few participants left deeply upset or frustrated. On average,

4. Patterns were essentially identical when male votes were excluded or with negative binomial regression (available from authors).

5. If the main unique feature of enclaves is to empower the disempowered, then the psychological benefits of enclaves may be especially pronounced for women who have most internalized the societal expectation to exert low authority. Considerable research shows that women tend to undervalue their performance and abilities (Kling et al. 1999), especially in contexts perceived to be masculine, such as politics (Fox and Lawless 2011). Groups that support their female members may ameliorate the negative effects of low confidence in particular (Karpowitz and Mendelberg 2014). To test this hypothesis, we interacted the enclave indicator with pretreatment confidence (a median split of a five-item index; appendix p. 1). In the analytical sample 37% of men and 56% of women reported low confidence. Under unanimous rule, enclaves increased perceived efficacy in the discussion and certainty in one's opinion (table A3) among low-confidence but not high-confidence women. We do not wish to overemphasize this effect, as the difference-in-differences test falls short of significance (table A4). Still, the results suggest that low-confidence women clearly benefit in the ways theories of gender roles would most expect, while the benefits for high-confidence women are unclear.

Table 3. Ability to Implement Preferences

	Unanimous						Majority					
	Certainty		Safety Net Preferences		Group Decision		Certainty		Safety Net Preferences		Group Decision	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Enclave	.09*	.09*	10.40**	10.77**	10.99**	11.01**	.05	.06	−1.02	−.76	3.62	4.45
	(.05)	(.05)	(2.93)	(2.72)	(3.68)	(3.82)	(.05)	(.07)	(4.16)	(4.68)	(3.40)	(3.70)
Number of egalitarians		−.04**		1.72**		.51		.01		.20		.95
		(.02)		(.76)		(1.47)		(.03)		(1.95)		(1.26)
Constant	.71**	.80**	23.77**	19.61**	21.19**	20.16**	.67**	.64**	33.30**	32.61**	28.19**	25.17**
	(.06)	(.08)	(2.74)	(3.38)	(2.44)	(3.20)	(.04)	(.12)	(4.95)	(7.49)	(3.97)	(5.27)
Observations	67	67	39	39	15	15	72	72	44	44	16	16
R^2	.08	.12	.39	.43	.50	.51	.02	.02	.02	.02	.09	.11

Note. Cell entries are ordinary least squares regression coefficients. Models 1–4 and 7–10 use cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by group). Models 5, 6, 11, and 12 are group-level analyses with standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include a control for experimental location (not shown). Observations for the safety net preferences variable are lower because some participants did not articulate an explicit preference during the discussion. Safety net preferences and group safety net decisions are in thousands of dollars. Significance tests are one-tailed.

* $p < .10$.

** $p < .05$.



Figure 1. Women's expressed preferences and group outcomes. Predicted values from models 4 and 6 of table 3. Bars are simulated means with controls for experimental location. *Left*, individual-level expressed safety net preferences; *right*, group's safety net decision. Spiked lines represent inferential confidence intervals (ICIs) computed using Tryon's (2001) method. Nonoverlapping ICSs indicate that the two means are statistically distinguishable from each other at the .05 level or better (one-tailed).

enclaves did not dramatically improve women's evaluations of the group.[6]

Direct test of the rule effect

In sum, enclaves increased women's empowerment on many—although not all—of the measures we examined, but those significant effects occur only under unanimous rule. This pattern is consistent with our theory of rules. In mixed-gender groups, unanimous rule empowers men at the expense of the female majority: men tend to leverage the need for consensus for their personal empowerment. And so, under this procedure, enclaves have the potential to boost women's authority. By contrast, majority rule disempowers men to the benefit of the female majority. Because women are already empowered under this rule, the move to enclaves matters little. Therefore, in majority-rule groups the effects of enclaves are considerably smaller.

A formal difference-in-difference test of the effect of the decision rule, for all models yielding at least marginally significant enclave effects, is in table 7 (see table A7 for details). Unanimous rule facilitated enclave benefits for women on most outcomes: their sense that their "voice was heard," their actual frequency of voicing their own opinion, their likelihood of taking part in the conversation as much as other members, their garnering authority in the eyes of others, and (marginally significant) their receiving immediate validation and avoiding negative interruptions while they speak. The conditioning effect of rule fell short of significance on only two of the tested outcomes: certainty about one's opinion and the group's decision (where the unit of analysis is the group and statistical power is low). That is, across multiple measures of empowerment, enclaves helped women much more under unanimous than majority rule.

Robustness checks

To ensure that the effects of enclaves did not hinge on the behavior of a small number of men in the baseline (groups with four women), we checked every significant effect, this time using groups with three or four women as the baseline. The effects of enclaves in unanimous groups were essentially

6. If enclaves confer the greatest benefits on women who have most internalized low levels of empowerment, the flip side is that others may not benefit from them and may even find some elements of enclaves off-putting. Groups with a homogeneous perspective may seek consensus by ignoring counterarguments, settling too readily on a favored outcome (Janis 1982; Klar 2014; but see Karpowitz and Raphael 2014). Although our statistical power is limited, we do find some suggestive evidence among high-confidence women, including a difference-in-differences effect on satisfaction (tables A5 and A6). Under each rule, high-confidence women evaluated discussion as less satisfying when in enclaves.

Table 4. Issue Agenda

	Unanimous				Majority			
	Care Issues		Financial Issues		Care Issues		Financial Issues	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Enclave	2.23	2.18	−.39	−.38	−.41	−1.91	−.22	−.91
	(3.47)	(3.41)	(.87)	(.88)	(4.02)	(3.57)	(1.27)	(1.27)
Number of egalitarians		−1.19		.18		−1.71		−.79*
		(1.12)		(.39)		(1.46)		(.49)
Constant	8.09**	10.84**	4.14**	3.74**	14.65**	20.03**	3.96**	6.45**
	(2.17)	(2.71)	(.76)	(1.24)	(3.35)	(5.22)	(.93)	(1.89)
Observations	67	67	67	67	72	72	72	72
R^2	.11	.12	.01	.01	.001	.03	.001	.04

Note. Cell entries are ordinary least squares regression coefficients; cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by group); significance tests are one-tailed. All regressions include a control for experimental location (not shown).
* $p < .10$.
** $p < .05$.

unchanged (table A8). We also addressed the possibility that the results were due to chance, given the large number of models. Each significant result was robust to a Bonferroni correction, and the effects of enclaves under unanimous rule on preference expression, the group's safety net decision, self-efficacy, and influence were also robust to a false discovery rate adjustment (Benjamini and Hochberg 1995; online appendix pp. 11–12).

Effects of enclaves on men

Finally, the theory of enclaves holds that enclaves are valuable for women because women face identity-based threats to their authoritative influence in mixed-gender groups. Testing this requires that we analyze the same dependent variables, this time comparing male enclaves to their relevant baseline, namely, groups with all-but-one man (tables A9 and A10). Consistent with expectations, enclaves carry no significant

Table 5. Talk Time and Influence

	Unanimous				Majority			
	Proportion Talk		Influence Votes		Proportion Talk		Influence Votes	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Enclave	.02*	.02**	.32**	.33**	−.004	−.01	−.19**	−.16**
	(.01)	(.01)	(.13)	(.12)	(.01)	(.01)	(.08)	(.09)
Number of egalitarians		.01		.10*		−.003		.03
		(.01)		(.07)		(.003)		(.03)
Constant	.19**	.16**	.57**	.34*	.20**	.21**	.94**	.84**
	(.01)	(.02)	(.11)	(.20)	(.01)	(.01)	(.09)	(.15)
Observations	67	67	67	67	72	72	72	72
R^2	.02	.03	.03	.04	.01	.01	.01	.01

Note. Cell entries are ordinary least squares regression coefficients; cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by group); significance tests are one-tailed. All regressions include a control for experimental location (not shown).
* $p < .10$.
** $p < .05$.

Table 6. Satisfaction with Group Processes

	Unanimous								Majority							
	Accomplish		Few Dominated		Satisfaction		Full Deliberation		Accomplish		Few Dominated		Satisfaction		Full Deliberation	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
Enclave	.03	.03	−.11	−.11	−.02	−.02	−.02	−.02	−.03	−.03	−.04	−.06	−.03	−.03	.003	.003
	(.06)	(.06)	(.10)	(.10)	(.07)	(.06)	(.04)	(.04)	(.05)	(.05)	(.08)	(.07)	(.04)	(.05)	(.06)	(.06)
Number of egalitarians		−.02		.03		−.06**		.002		−.004		−.02		.00001		.001
		(.05)		(.05)		(.03)		(.02)		(.02)		(.03)		(.02)		(.03)
Constant	.66**	.70**	.65**	.59**	.70**	.84**	.62**	.62**	.62**	.63**	.43**	.50**	.73**	.73**	.55**	.54**
	(.04)	(.12)	(.09)	(.14)	(.05)	(.10)	(.02)	(.05)	(.06)	(.09)	(.08)	(.08)	(.03)	(.06)	(.04)	(.11)
Observations	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	72	72	72	72	72	72	72	72
R^2	.004	.01	.05	.06	.04	.13	.04	.04	.04	.04	.01	.02	.11	.11	.002	.002

Note. Cell entries are ordinary least squares regression coefficients; cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by group); significance tests are one-tailed. All regressions include a control for experimental location (not shown).

* $p < .10$.

** $p < .05$.

Table 7. Difference-in-Differences Tests of the Effect of Enclaves across Decision Rules

	Effect of Unanimous Decision Rule	*p*
Positive interruptions	.014	.065
Negative interruptions	−.205	.069
Voice heard	.114	.009
Certainty	.04	.289
Safety net preference	8.963	.046
Group safety net decision	6.10	.137
Proportion talk	.025	.0495
Influence votes	.462	.002

Note. Cell entries are results of difference-in-differences tests showing the effect of a unanimous decision rule on each variable and one-sided *p*-values. Difference in differences and *p*-values computed from models in table A5.

benefits to men, under either rule. The only effects at the .05 level (one-tailed) involve men's talk time and influence in majority-rule enclaves—where the enclave effect is negative, suggesting that men are less empowered in enclaves. There are also no conditional effects of enclaves by decision rule, with one minor exception (table A11). In sum, enclaves do not operate symmetrically for each gender; rather, they empower the disempowered.

CONCLUSION

The notion that disadvantaged groups cannot advance without their own social space is a widely held assumption. Yet this claim has not been systematically tested. Furthermore, scholars know little about how enclaves create this benefit. The process by which groups shape their members' sense of empowerment and motivation to pursue ambitious collective goals remains understudied. This study addresses these gaps by developing and testing a theory of gender enclaves that attends to their distinctive feature—these groups are composed entirely of women.

A literature in political theory implicitly endorses the notion that women need and benefit from enclaves (Karpowitz and Raphael 2014). For example, Fraser lauds all-female groups as providing an oppositional space for women where they can develop their own authentic perspectives and preferences, calling them "a counter-civil society of alternative woman-only voluntary associations" (1990, 61). Similarly, Young argues that "members of oppressed groups need separate organizations that exclude others, especially those from more privileged groups. Separate organization is probably necessary in order for these groups to discover and reinforce the positivity of their specific experience . . . [and] determine their specific needs and interests" (2011, 167). However, it remains unclear in this literature whether these groups are assumed to help women mobilize because they are "woman-only," and if so, why. This study has developed reasons why enclaves may be an important remedy for inequality.

We found some support for this theory of enclaves. These groups offer a more supportive environment for women, providing more validation to women as they speak; build women's self-efficacy; facilitate more equal participation; boost women's perceived influence in the eyes of other members; prompt women to advocate for greater generosity toward the vulnerable, as their private priorities tend to prefer; and change the group's decision.

Two of these effects are especially important. First, enclaves leave women with greater stores of authority than when they began, pointing the way to downstream effects that last beyond a given meeting. Second, enclaves settle on far more ambitious policy. The group decides to redistribute considerably more money to alleviate poverty and economic disadvantage when it is composed entirely of women. This too may have important downstream effects. Where women's groups function as interest groups or social movements, they may aim for much more significant policy change if they organize as enclaves. Alternatively, where enclaves actually govern, they may implement policy that addresses the ills of economic inequality much more robustly.

However, enclaves carry the expected benefits only in some circumstances. Most important, the effects of enclaves depend on the rules and procedures the group uses to govern its deliberation and reach collective decisions. In the typical setting of official decision making, whether by citizens or elites, groups often rely on procedures that build in an assumption of adversarial interaction and legitimize the power of the numerical majority (Mansbridge 1983). Under those conditions, it suffices for women to compose a large majority of the members; enclaves do not carry added benefits, and it is not necessary to exclude men in order to empower women. But under a consensus process, women do benefit from all-female groups.

Finally, we found that the effects of enclaves are confined to women. As the relevant theories expect, enclaves help those who typically face disadvantage in the discursive enterprise. Men do not face disempowering norms of conversation, and so, they do not benefit (as men).

How do these results generalize beyond the groups we studied? The advantage of strong causal inference frequently comes with more uncertain generalizability. The groups we studied interacted once, relatively briefly. Unlike participants in many natural settings, the individuals in these groups were not activists or politicians who might possess expertise and

confidence. We were not able to observe them long term. Finally, they knew they were being studied.

Nevertheless, the patterns we observed are probably similar in the political settings we are interested in. First, results from other analyses of these groups have been validated with school board meetings. In those meetings, members interact repeatedly and at length. They self-select into the setting. They bring, and build, relevant expertise. Finally, they are not aware of being studied (Karpowitz and Mendelberg 2014). And yet, their behavior closely matches the behavior documented in the groups we studied. Second, other observational studies of naturally occurring groups support the basic conclusion that enclaves can help women (Burns et al. 2001; Katzenstein 1990; Polletta 2002). In that sense, the results here plausibly apply to the kinds of groups that motivated the study (detailed in the article's introduction), including interest and civic groups, party activists, and legislators.

An additional consideration is the homogeneity of the groups in the study. The sample is homogenous with respect to race and ethnicity and overrepresents higher levels of education. In our view, this type of homogeneity is helpful for external validity. The vast majority of Americans live racially and economically segregated lives, in neighborhoods, civic organizations, local political institutions, and occupations where they interact largely with people like them (Sampson 2013). Public meetings are often quite homogenous with respect to race and class (Mendelberg and Oleske 2000). In that sense, the situation in this study bears a resemblance to the kinds of situations the article is interested in understanding. That said, with more heterogeneity, enclaves may not have the same effects. Exploring heterogeneity, including intersectionality, is an important task for future research.

A final consideration is the ecological validity of the procedures. Given our finding that unanimous enclaves make a difference, we must make the case that enclaves in fact use unanimity to a meaningful extent. In fact, a number of case studies have documented the existence of all-female groups that view consensus as a desirable process and use it with some frequency (Cramer 2004; Katzenstein 1990; Polletta 2002). This conclusion is supported as well by large-*N* research. For example, Burt's large survey of women's organizations found that a consensus process was either the most or the second-most common form of decision making in these groups (Burt 1990, 21). And so, it seems that the procedures in this study exist among naturally occurring groups.

In sum, enclaves are a common, and often beneficial, form of social organization for those who have internalized role expectations about their low authority. But their distinctive advantages are contingent on other features of the group—specifically, a consensus procedure. Under this procedure, the homogeneous enclave is the right institutional choice for women's empowerment.

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