College Socialization and the Economic Views of Affluent Americans

Supplemental Information

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Description of the Sample

The HERI CIRP panel dataset consists of a freshman (TFS) and a senior (CSS) wave. We include only individuals who are full-time students and are entering postsecondary four-year institutions for the first time in the year they completed the TFS. In the primary analyses, we include only respondents who are in the same institution in both waves. There are a small number of respondents who switched institutions between the TFS and CSS, but we do not observe how long these students spend at their TFS or CSS institution. We include in the CSS only respondents who have spent at least four academic years at the institution—regardless of whether the respondent is a graduating senior—as well as respondents who have spent exactly three years at the institution and indicate they are graduating seniors.

To construct freshman cohort- and school-level variables and measure re-interview rates we use additional TFS respondents from CIRP's larger National Norms sample when available. This dataset is larger because it includes first-time full-time respondents interviewed in their freshman year regardless of whether they were re-interviewed. We combine students in the target year (the respondent's freshman year) and the preceding year's cohort. We do not use the year after, because we want to measure the norms set by the older and thus higher-status cohort. We only consider the measure to be valid if at least 100 respondents from the school across these two cohorts have provided data. Cases that do not meet this standard are treated as missing data.

We exclude from the panel analysis those who are neither citizens nor permanent residents to avoid bias from including affluent foreign students who have developed their class-based status, resources, attitudes and orientations outside the United States. However, we retain these students in the larger TFS dataset that we use to construct the school-level measures of affluence. The presence of affluent foreign students may still contribute to the overall class composition of the campus environment.

A description of the College and Beyond dataset is provided on SI p. 12-13.

Missing Data

We do not have information about school affluence for 12.35% of our 93,032 panelists. Of the remaining panelists, we do not have individual-level income information for 9.73% of respondents. We omit these cases from the data. This results in a full panel N of 72,823. Using the individual-level affluence threshold based on the 90th percentile threshold of the national income distribution (described in sections below), 32,876 (or 45.15%) of the remaining respondents are affluent students. We lose an additional 11.4% of our data (taking our N to 29,113) in our multivariate regression analyses due to certain TFS and CSS questions not being asked across all years of our sample, as well as item non-response—of which no item in the basic model contains more than 4.3% missing data. We use listwise deletion for the 11.4% of missing data among affluent respondents.

Attrition

A covariate balance check between the TFS and the TFS-CSS panel indicates that students of lower socioeconomic status (SES) are less likely to reappear in the CSS, but SES-based attrition is substantively small (mean TFS income in the larger TFS sample is 9.00, in the TFS-CSS panel sample it is 9.2 out of 14 categories). Both these scores are within the same category of the HERI income variable (\$50,000 to \$59,999). We also compared the proportion of income subgroups. Those with incomes below \$40,000 represent a greater proportion of respondents in the TFS sample, while those with incomes above \$50,000 generally represent a greater proportion of the panel than the TFS sample. Again, however, the differences are substantively small, never amounting to even a 1-percentage point difference. The biggest difference on any class-related variable is for Pell grant recipients, but even that is only a 3-percentage point difference. Therefore we do not make adjustments based on selective attrition. ¹

Software for Estimation

We use the R package Ime4 and the function "Imer" for all random effects estimation. Currently, this estimation does not provide p-values to help detect whether effects are significant. We use the normal approximation to calculate p-values based on the t-statistics estimated in the model. At reasonable sample sizes, the p-values are nearly indistinguishable from alternative simulation methods.²

Measuring Affluence

We use the income distribution at the national level to determine whether an individual is affluent.³ The HERI TFS income question is: "What is your best estimate of your parents' total income last year?"

- 1 = Less than \$6,000
- 2 = \$6,000-\$9,999
- 3 = \$10,000-\$14,999
- 4 = \$15,000-\$19,999

¹ Re-interview rates: Calculating re-interview rates is difficult with CIRP data because many students in the TFS were not asked to take the CSS. We only include respondents whose school code shows up 4 years later in CSS data, meaning they presumably had an opportunity to take the CSS. The re-interview rates with that denominator are: TFS 1993: 9 percent; TFS 1994: 26 percent; TFS 1997: 25 percent. These re-interview rates calculate the proportion of students in the TFS 1993, 1994, or 1997 National Norms cohort who appear in the 1997, 1998, or 2001 CSS panel data, the years for which the necessary respondent identifiers are available. It is possible that some students from those TFS years may appear in our data during a different CSS year. We are unable to compute re-interview rates for panelists in freshman cohorts that were not included in the TFS National Norms sample described below. The re-interview rates we calculate are similar to the rate of 0.25 calculated for CIRP data by Sharkness (2012).

² http://mindingthebrain.blogspot.com/2014/02/three-ways-to-get-parameter-specific-p.html

³ Income data comes from the Current Population Survey compiled by the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS-CPS). The household incomes for each year are reported in the CPS in March of the following year. We weight the data using the household post-stratification weights provided.

5 = \$20,000-\$24,999

6 = \$25,000-\$29,999

7 = \$30,000-\$39,999

8 = \$40,000-\$49,999

9 = \$50,000-\$59,999

10 = \$60,000-\$74,999

11 = \$75,000-\$99,999

12 = \$100,000-\$149,999

13 = \$150,000-\$199,999

14 = \$200,000 or more

We consider an individual to be affluent if their self-reported parental income is in a TFS income category that includes or is above the income corresponding to the 90th percentile rank in the national distribution in the year the respondent took the TFS. If the 90th percentile income for a given year falls below the midpoint of a TFS income category, we also include respondents as affluent if their reported parental income falls in the TFS income category one category below the category that includes the 90th percentile income. We vary the income cutoffs by year because the income at the 90th percentile also varies widely across years in the TFS data (1989-1998). The table below provides the income associated with the 90th percentiles for the nation for each year from 1989 to 1998, and the TFS income categories that will be considered "affluent" for each year.

IPUMS-CPS 90th Percentile Household Incomes and Corresponding TFS "Affluent" Income Cutoffs

	90 th Percentile National Income	TFS Categories Considered Affluent
1998	102,010	11, 12, 13, 14
1997	98,262	11, 12, 13, 14
1996	92,374	11, 12, 13, 14
1995	88,250	11, 12, 13, 14
1994	84,808	10, 11, 12, 13, 14
1993	81,670	10, 11, 12, 13, 14
1992	77,971	10, 11, 12, 13, 14
1991	75,766	10, 11, 12, 13, 14
1990	74,000	10, 11, 12, 13, 14
1989	71,846	10, 11, 12, 13, 14

Zip Code Based Affluence Measure

Because of concerns regarding the accuracy of respondents' self-reported income, as well as variation in the income distribution across regions of the United States, we replicate the effect of campus affluence with a geography-based income measure. Students must both self-report an affluent income according to the standards discussed above and also report an affluent permanent home zip code. Student zip codes are only fully available in the 1997 and 2001 senior cohorts (n = 34,640). We measure the median household income in the zip codes of these respondents. For respondents who took the TFS in 1989 through 1994, the median household income measure is drawn from the 1990 census. For respondents who took the TFS in 1995 through 1998 the median household measure is drawn from the 2000 census.

We check for robustness using two separate thresholds. The first defines affluent respondents as those with affluent incomes and in zip codes with median household incomes in the top 10% of the *national* zip code median household income distribution. The second identifies affluent respondents as those with affluent incomes and in zip codes with median household incomes in the top 10% of the *regional* zip code median household income distribution. The estimated effect of the highest category of campus affluence from the main random effects model is similar in each of the two replications (*national*: 0.037, p=0.066, N=4902, school n=239; *regional*: 0.068, p=0.01, N=4201, school n=232).

Variable Wording, Coding, and Distributions

All descriptive statistics and figures in the first subsection are for the HERI sample of affluent students included in the primary model of taxing the wealthy. A second subsection provides descriptive statistics for the College and Beyond sample of affluent students included in the replication model (Table 2 of the paper) and the models of cross-class contact effects (SI p. 26). We also provide selected descriptive statistics for HERI non-affluent students on SI p. 17.

Variables were coded based on their distributions and conceptual definitions. For control dummy variables, we collapsed categories that had similar effects when this made no difference to estimates of interest.

The data below comes from one of four sources: HERI freshman survey (TFS), HERI's senior survey (CSS), HERI's faculty survey (FAC), or the College and Beyond survey (CB). Unless otherwise noted, all variables are measured using data from the HERI freshman survey with descriptive statistics based on the sample of affluent students present in the two-wave panel data, which links responses to the TFS and CSS.

HERI Variables

Main Dependent Variable	Coding	Distributional Information
Tax the wealthy (TFS/CSS)	Agree strongly=0, Agree	Freshman year (Lagged DV):
	somewhat=0.33, Disagree	4-point scale, 0 to 1; Mean =
"Mark <u>one</u> in each row:"	somewhat=0.66, Disagree	0.48; SD = 0.33
	strongly=1	
("Wealthy people should pay a		Senior year: 4-point scale, 0
larger share of taxes than they do		to 1; Mean = 0.50; SD = 0.32
now")		
Agree strongly (1); Agree		
somewhat (2); Disagree		
somewhat (3); Disagree strongly		
(4)		

Placebo Dependent Variables	Coding	Distributional Information
Abortion, Homosexual	Abortion: Agree strongly=0, Agree	Abortion: Freshman year
Relationships, and Racial	somewhat=0.33, Disagree	(Lagged DV): 4-point scale, 0
Discrimination (TFS/CSS)	somewhat=0.66, Disagree	to 1; Mean = 0.47; SD = 0.41
	strongly=1	/ Senior year: 4-point scale,
"Mark one in each row:"		0 to 1; Mean = 0.41; SD =

("Abortion should be legal"; "It is important to have laws prohibiting homosexual relationships"; "Racial discrimination is no longer a major problem in America.") Agree strongly (1); Agree	Homosexual Relationships: Agree strongly=0, Agree somewhat=0.33, Disagree somewhat=0.66, Disagree strongly=1	0.39 Homosexual Relationships: Freshman year (Lagged DV): 4-point scale, 0 to 1; Mean = 0.29; SD = 0.33 / Senior year: 4-point scale, 0 to 1; Mean = 0.21 SD = 0.30
somewhat (2); Disagree somewhat (3); Disagree strongly (4)	Racial Discrimination: Agree strongly=0, Agree somewhat=0.33, Disagree somewhat=0.66, Disagree strongly=1	Racial Discrimination: Freshman year (Lagged DV): 4-point scale, 0 to 1; Mean = 0.23; SD = 0.25 / Senior year: 4-point scale, 0 to 1; Mean = 0.21; SD = 0.24

Individual Level Controls or	Coding	Distributional Information
Moderators		
SAT/ACT score ⁴	High standardized test score: Score 1360 or above; yes=1; otherwise or missing=0	Score 1360 or above: 15%
Self-reported high school GPA	High H.S. GPA: A- or above; yes=1; otherwise=0	A- or above: 58%
College aspirations	Attend to make money: Very important=1; otherwise=0	Attend to make money: Very Important: 62%
"In deciding to go to college, how important to you was each of the following reasons?" ("To be able to make more money"; "To learn more about things that interest me")	Attend to gain knowledge: Very important; yes=1; otherwise=0	Attend to gain knowledge: Very important: 80%
Not important (1); Somewhat important (2); Very important (3)		
Gender	Female=1; Male=0 (reference)	Female: 58%

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⁴ We measure achievement test scores using a joint measure of ACT and SAT performance based on the College Board's SAT-ACT concordance table. We replace missing SAT scores with ACT scores where possible. The SAT re-centered the score scales in April 1995. This process reestablished the mean score to about 500 for college-bound seniors, the midpoint the on 200-800 score scale. Self-reported scores pre-recentering are adjusted, for the 1989-1995 cohorts, with the assumption that individuals took the SAT in the calendar year prior to the year they complete the TFS.

"Your sex:"		
Male; Female		
Race	1. White or Asian: yes=1;	White or Asian: 92%;
	otherwise=0 (reference)	
"Are you:"		
	2. Black: yes=1; otherwise=0	Black: 2%
White/Caucasian; African		
American/Black; American Indian;	3. Latino: yes=1; otherwise=0	Latino: 2%
Asian American/Asian; Mexican		
American/Chicano; Puerto Rican;	4. Other race (American	Other race: 4%
Other Latino; Other	Indian, Two or more	
	race/ethnicity, Other): yes=1: otherwise=0	
Religious affiliation	1. Roman Catholic or Mainline	Roman Catholic or Mainline:
Religious armation	Protestant: yes=1;	74%
"Current religious preference:"	otherwise=0 (reference)	, .,,
garage and processing	(Includes: Congregational,	
Baptist; Buddhist; Eastern Orthodox;	Eastern Orthodox, Episcopal,	
Episcopal; Islamic; Jewish; LDS	Lutheran, Methodist,	
(Mormon); Lutheran; Methodist;	Presbyterian, Quaker, and	
Presbyterian; Quaker; Roman	other Christians who indicate	
Catholic; Seventh Day Adventist;	they are not born again	
United Church of Christ; Other	Christians.)	
Christian; Other Religion; None		
" 5	2. Evangelical: yes=1;	Evangelical: 11%
"Do you consider yourself a born-	otherwise=0 (Includes:	
again Christian?"	Baptist, Seventh Day Adventist, and other	
Yes; No	Christians who indicate they	
163, 140	are born again Christians.)	
	are som again emistiansi,	
	3. Jewish: yes=1; otherwise=0	Jewish: 2%
	4. Other or no religion: yes=1;	Other or no religion: 14%
	otherwise=0	
	In secondary models:	
Distance from college	Lives within 100 mi: yes=1; otherwise=0	Lives within 100 mi: 30%
"How many miles is this college from		
your permanent home?"		
5 or less (1); 6 to 10 (2); 11 to 50 (3);		
51 to 100 (4); 101 to 500 (5); Over		
500 (6)		
Close to home	Attend because close to home:	Attending because close to
	very Important= 1;	home: 10%
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"How important was each reason in	otherwise=0	
your decision to come here" ("I		
wanted to live near home.")		
Not important (1); Somewhat		
important (2);		
Very important (3)		
Business major (Intended)	Intended business major:	Intended business major:
	yes=1; otherwise=0	15%
"Below is a list of different		
undergraduate major fields grouped		
into general categories. Mark only		
one oval to indicate your probable		
field of study." ⁵		
licia di staay.		
Business major (Actual) (CSS)	Actual business major: ⁷	
Business major (Actual) (CSS)	Actual business major.	
"Below is a list of different major	1. Never intended or was	Never business: 76%
fields. Mark only one in each	business major-yes=1;	Never business. 70%
column"("Undergraduate major (final	otherwise=0 (reference)	
or most recent)") ⁶	otherwise-o (reference)	
of most recently y	2 Changed into hysiness	Changed into business, 70/
	2. Changed into business	Changed into business: 7%
	major- yes=1; otherwise=0	
	3. Changed from horizon	Change from husings 50/
	3. Changed from business	Change from business: 5%
	major- yes=1; otherwise=0	
	4. Always business major-	Always business: 7%
	yes=1; otherwise=0	
Social embeddedness (CSS)	Frequent socializer: Socializing	Socializing more than 20
	with friends more than 20	hours: 25%
Frequent socializer	hours per week; yes=1	
"During the past year, how much	otherwise=0	
time did you spend during a typical		
week doing the following activities?"		
("Socializing with friends")		
None (1); Less than 1 hour (2); 1 to 2		
hours (3); 3 to 5 hours (4); 6 to 10		
hours (5); 11 to 15 hours (6); 16 to 20		
hours (7); Over 20 hours (8)		

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 $^{^{5}}$ List of majors available to students available: www.heri.ucla.edu/researchersToolsCodebooks.php 6 lbid.

⁷ Business major includes: Business Administration (general), Finance, International Business, Marketing, Management, other Business

Greek life "Since entering college have you:" ("Joined a fraternity or sorority")	Greek life: Joined a fraternity or sorority; yes=1; otherwise=0	Joined fraternity or sorority: 26%
Yes (1); No (2)		
Frequency of political discussion over	Political discussion: not at	Freshman year: 3-point scale,
the past year (TFS/CSS)	all=0, occasionally= 0.5,	0 to 1; Mean = 0.55; SD =
	frequently=1	0.32; Range = 0, 1; Senior
"Indicate which of the activities you		year: 3-point scale, 0 to 1;
did during the past year" ("Discussed		Mean = 0.50; SD = 0.31
politics")		
Not at all (1): Occasionally (2);		
Frequently (3)		

Cohort Level Controls, Mediators or Moderators ⁸	Coding	Distributional Information
Selectivity	Proportion high standardized test score: Proportion first-time full-time freshmen with test scores of 1360 or above	Proportion high standardized test score: continuous, 0 to 1; Mean = 0.12; SD = 0.14; Range = 0.00, 0.85
	Proportion high H.S. GPA: Proportion of students with self-reported high school GPA A- or above	Proportion high H.S. GPA: continuous, 0 to 1; Mean = 0.52; SD = 0.20; Range = 0.03, 0.95
College aspirations	Proportion attending to make money: Proportion Indicating "Very important";	Proportion attending to make money: continuous, 0 to 1; Mean = 0.63; SD = 0.10; Range = 0.17, 0.89
	Treated as categorical in the moderation specification based on the affluent panel distribution: i. Less than 58 perc. attend to make money. Less than 58% =1; otherwise=0 (reference) ii. 58-70 perc. attend to make money: 58-70% =1; otherwise=0 iii. More than 70 perc. attend to	Less than 58 perc. attend to make money: Bottom 20% of distribution. 58-70 perc. attend to make money: Middle 60% of the distribution More than 70 perc. attend to

⁸ For some variables, the number or proportions of students at a school do not vary substantially by year. In particular, school size and schools that are "mostly black" or "mostly female" (defined in this section) remain in these categories across all TFS years in our sample. We therefore treat these three variables (school size, mostly black, and mostly female) as school-level variables.

	make money: 70% or more =1; otherwise=0	make money: Top 20% of the distribution
	Proportion attending to gain knowledge: Proportion Indicating "Very important"	Proportion attending to gain knowledge: continuous, 0 to 1; Mean = 0.79; SD = 0.06; Range = 0.58, 0.97
Race (note: <i>Mostly Black</i> treated as school-level variable due to lack of variation between cohorts)	Proportion Black first-time full-time freshmen— <i>Mostly Black:</i> More than 89 percent Black (99 th Percentile); yes=1; otherwise=0	Mostly Black: 1%
	Proportion Latino first-time full-time freshmen— <i>Proportion Latino:</i> 5% or more Latino (85 th Percentile); yes=1; otherwise=0	More than 5% Latino: Top 15% of sample
	Proportion other race first-time full- time freshmen— <i>Proportion other race</i> : 8% or more other race (85 th Percentile); yes=1; otherwise=0	More than 8% other race: Top 15% of sample
Female (note: treated as school-level variable due to lack of variation between cohorts)	Proportion Female first-time full-time freshmen— <i>Mostly female</i> (more than 95 percent); yes=1; otherwise=0	Mostly female: 2%
Religious Affiliation	Proportion Evangelical: More than 40% Evangelical (90 th percentile); yes=1; otherwise=0.	More than 40% Evangelical: Top 10% of sample
	Proportion Jewish: More than 5% Jewish (85 th percentile); yes=1; otherwise=0	More than 5% Jewish: Top 15% of sample
	Proportion other or no religion: More than 30% other or no religion (85 th percentile); yes=1; otherwise=0	More than 30% other or no religion: Top 15% of sample
	In secondary models	
Cohort opposition to taxation	Mean cohort response to tax the wealthy item in freshman survey.	continuous, 0 to 1; Mean = 0.42; SD = 0.06; Range = 0.19, 0.60
Business majors	High proportion intending a business major: Treated as dichotomous where being in the top 15% of the distribution (above 20.9%)=1 and otherwise=0 in an alternative specification.	High proportion intending a business major: Top 15% of distribution

School-Level Controls	Coding	Distributional Information
School Size ⁹	Number of first-time full-time (FTFT) freshmen at school—Large student body: Greater than 1482 FTFT Freshmen; yes=1; otherwise=0	Large student body: Top 20% of sample
School Type	Public college or university: public = 1; private = 0	Public: 9%
School region ¹⁰	1. Midwest or West: yes=1; otherwise=0 (reference) 2. Northeast: yes=1; otherwise=0 3. South: yes=1; otherwise=0 In secondary models	Midwest or West: 43% Northeast: 33%; South: 24%
	,	
Faculty views (FAC) Tax the wealthy	Mean faculty tax view: Average faculty views on taxation (Available 1989)	Mean faculty tax view: 4-point scale, 0 to 1; Mean = 0.24; SD = 0.07; Range = 0.07, 0.52
"Mark <u>one</u> in each row:"		
("Wealthy people should pay a larger share of taxes than they do now")		
Agree strongly (1); Agree somewhat (2); Disagree somewhat (3); Disagree strongly (4)		
"How would you characterize your political views?"	Mean faculty ideology: Average faculty views on ideology variable across years available in the sample (Available 1989, 1992, 1995, and 1998)	Mean faculty ideology: 5-point scale, 0 to 1; Mean = 0.42; SD = 0.06; Range = 0.26, 0.64

⁹ School size could not be accurately measured by aggregating freshman survey data, so we use data from the IPEDS database, a repository for college statistics: https://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/datacenter/

¹⁰ We use regions defined by IPUMS-CPS: Northeast Region (New England Division: Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont; Middle Atlantic Division: New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania); Midwest (East North Central Division: Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin; West North Central Division: Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota); South Region (South Atlantic Division: Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia; East South Central Division: Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, Tennessee; West South Central Division: Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas); West Region (Mountain Division: Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, Wyoming; Pacific Division: Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon, Washington).

Far left (1), Liberal (2), Middle-of-the-road (3), Conservative (4), Far right (5)		
Local economic context	County-level inequality: Household Gini coefficient in the county where a student's campus is located, measured with the 2000 census. ¹¹	County-level inequality: continuous; Mean =0.45; SD = 0.04; Range = 0.37, 0.59
	County-level poverty: Percent living below the federal poverty line in the county where a student's campus is located, measured with the 2000 census. ¹²	County-level poverty: continuous; Mean =0.12; SD = 0.05; Range = 0.03, 0.33

College and Beyond (CB) Variables

The Mellon Foundation's College and Beyond (CB) dataset consists of students' freshman HERI surveys from 1989 merged with a College and Beyond follow-up survey administered in 1997, four years post-graduation. The CB data is unique in providing self-reported data from up to four schools to which students applied, as well as whether or not they were accepted to these schools. We use HERI data to measure percent affluent for a subset of these schools where possible, allowing us to control for the median percent affluent at the schools to which students applied, excluding the school attended by the student.

The full 1989 CB survey consists of 9,549 respondents at 21 schools. The primary mode of surveying was through the mail, with respondents who did not respond to mailings contacted by phone. Seventy-six percent of matriculants who had entered these schools in the 1989 cohort responded to the survey. Six of the 21 schools did not participate in HERI's freshman survey and are excluded from this analysis. This leaves 5,671 respondents at 15 schools. Of these respondents, 2,969 are identified as affluent using a threshold of \$50,000. This threshold corresponds to the 77th percentile of the national household income distribution, which is lower than the 90th percentile threshold we use in the HERI analysis. We

¹¹ https://geodacenter.asu.edu/%5Btermalias-raw%5D/household-incom-0

¹² https://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/data/census/2000/poppvstat00.html

¹³ The schools analyzed include: Princeton University, Wesleyan University, Xavier University, Morehouse College, Penn State University, Bryn Mawr College, Wellesley College, Miami University – Ohio, Oberlin College, Stanford University, University of Pennsylvania, Williams College, Kenyon College, University of North Carolina, and Vanderbilt University.

¹⁴ Respondents are asked, "Back when you were applying to undergraduate schools, which school did you <u>most</u> want to attend, that is, what was your first choice school?" Students who indicated this was "another school" besides where they attended named this school and whether they applied to and were accepted by the school. Students were then asked: "In rough order of preference, please list the other undergraduate schools you seriously considered. If there were more than three, list the three of most interest to you." Students were asked whether they applied to and were accepted by the schools.

use this lower threshold to increase the sample size and statistical power. Percent affluent at the schools was measured as the percentage of students from families making over \$60,000 (84th percentile).

We were able to measure percent affluent for at least one unattended school to which the student submitted an application for 1,634 affluent students (55% of the affluent students who participated in the HERI and CB surveys). Of these students, 10% were missing data one or more variables used on our models, leaving us with a sample of 1,469 affluent students.

In Table 2 in the paper, we predict students' economic conservatism. Due to the substantial reduction in statistical power we trimmed the controls to the most essential cohort- and school-level variables, while maintaining the full range of individual-level controls. CB did not contain a freshman year version of the economic conservatism DV, so we added freshman-year ideological conservatism and preference for raising taxes to reduce the deficit in order to approximate a lagged DV. We also added a variable measuring the importance of having a career with high earnings, a variable that was not available in the full HERI sample.

Dependent Variable	Coding	Distributional Information
Economic conservatism	1 (Very liberal)=0, 2=0.25, 3=0.5, 4=0.75, 5	5-point scale, 0 to 1; Mean
	(Very conservative)=1	= 0.51; SD = 0.28
"Thinking about your views		
concerning economic and		
social issues, where would		
you place yourself on the		
scale below:" ("Economic		
issues" ¹⁵)		
1 (Very liberal); 2; 3; 4; 5		
(Very conservative)		

School Level Predictor	Coding	Distributional Information
Percent affluent	1. Less than 50% affluent: yes=1; otherwise=0 (reference)	Less than 50% affluent: 16%
	2. 50 - 64% affluent: yes=1; otherwise=0	50 - 64% affluent: 45%
	3. More than 64% affluent: yes=1; otherwise=0	More than 64% affluent: 39%
Applied to affluent and non- affluent schools subset (CB)	1. Accepted to non-affluent schools only: yes=1; otherwise=0 (reference)	Accepted to non-affluent schools only: 58%

¹⁵ "Social issues" was then asked about separately.

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2. Accepted to affluent schools only:	Accepted to affluent schools
yes=1; otherwise=0	only: 42%

Individual Level Controls	Coding	Distributional Information
Application median percent affluent	Application median percent affluent: Median percent affluent at schools applied to by the student, not including the school attended. Students were able to list up to four colleges to which they applied, as well as whether or not they were accepted.	continuous, 0 to 1; Mean = 0.55; SD = 0.10; Range = 0.08, 0.68
"How would you characterize your political views?" Far right (1); Conservative (2); Middle-of-the-road (3); Liberal (4); Far left (5)	Far left=0, Liberal=0.25, Middle-of-the-road=0.5, Conservative=0.75, Far right=1	5-point scale, 0 to 1; Mean = 0.45; SD = 0.21
Raise taxes to reduce deficit "Please indicate your agreement with the following statements" ("The federal government should raise taxes to reduce the deficit.") Agree strongly (1); Agree somewhat (2); Disagree somewhat (3); Disagree strongly (4)	Raise tax to reduce deficit: Agree strongly=0, Agree somewhat=0.33, Disagree somewhat=0.66, Disagree strongly=1	4-point scale, 0 to 1; Mean = 0.49; SD = 0.28
Important to have a career with high earnings ¹⁶ "Which of the following are important to you in your long-term choice of career occupation?" ("High anticipated earnings") Not important (1); Somewhat important (2) Very important (3); Essential (4)	Important career with high earnings: Not important=0, Somewhat important=0.33, Very important=0.66, Essential=1	4-point scale, 0 to 1; Mean = 0.53; SD = 0.30

¹⁶ This variable was not available for the basic HERI analysis.

SAT/ACT score	High standardized test score: Score 1360 or above; yes=1; otherwise or missing=0	Score 1360 or above: 50%
Self-reported high school GPA	High H.S. GPA: A- or above; yes=1; otherwise=0	A- or above: 59%
	Missing H.S. GPA ¹⁷ : yes=1; otherwise=0	Missing H.S. GPA: 13%
College aspirations (See HERI section for wording)	Attend to make money: Very important = 1; otherwise=0	Attend to make money: 48%
	Attend to gain knowledge: Very important; yes=1; otherwise=0	Attend to gain knowledge: 85%
Gender	Female = 1; Male = 0 (reference)	Female: 51%
Race	1. White or Asian: yes=1; otherwise=0 (reference)	White or Asian: 88%
	2. Black: yes=1; otherwise=0	Black: 7%
	3. Latino: yes=1; otherwise=0	Latino: 2%
	4. Other race (American Indian, Two or more race/ethnicity, Other): yes=1: otherwise=0	Other race: 3%
Religious affiliation	1. Roman Catholic or Mainline Protestant: yes=1; otherwise=0 (reference) (Includes: Congregational, Eastern Orthodox, Episcopal, Lutheran, Methodist, Presbyterian, Quaker, and other Christians who indicate they are not born again Christians.)	Roman Catholic or Mainline: 51%
	2. Evangelical: yes=1; otherwise/NA=0 (Includes: Baptist, Seventh Day Adventist)	Evangelical: 12%
	3. Jewish: yes=1; otherwise=0	Jewish: 10%
	4. Other or no religion: yes=1; otherwise=0	Other or no religion: 27%
	In secondary models:	

¹⁷ One school in the College and Beyond dataset was missing High School GPA for all its students, so we insert a dummy for missingness on this variable to avoid dropping this school from the analysis.

Cross-class contact (CB)	Knew 2+ poorer students well: yes=1; otherwise=0	Knew 2+ poorer students well: 66%
"Did you get to know 2 or	Kanan 2. manifelian atudant mali man 1.	Kanana 2 a manalahin metudan k
more of these students <u>well</u> while in school?"	Knew 2+ wealthier student well: yes=1; otherwise=0	Knew 2+ wealthier student well: 72%
("From a family much poorer		
than yours?"; "From a family much wealthier than yours?")		
Yes (1); No (0)		


School Level Controls	Coding	Distributional Information
Selectivity	Proportion High standardized test score: Proportion first-time full-time freshmen with test scores of 1360 or above	Proportion High test score: continuous, 0 to 1; Mean = 0.41; SD = 0.24 Range = 0.00, 0.69
	Proportion High H.S. GPA: Proportion of students with self-reported high school GPA A- or above	Proportion High H.S. GPA: continuous, 0 to 1; Mean = 0.72; SD = 0.16; Range = 0.22, 0.96
Race	All Black: HBCU=1; otherwise=0	All Black: 2%
Female	All female: All female=1; otherwise=0	All female: 5%

Auxiliary Analyses and Robustness Checks

Descriptive Statistics, Sensitivity to Covariates, and School-Level Analysis

This section includes the distribution of the primary dependent variable in the HERI sample, and comparisons of that dependent variable between affluent and non-affluent students and between colleges with more and less affluent students.

The figure below plots the distribution of the primary dependent variable among affluent students in freshman (left) and senior year (right).



The table below shows the means for affluent and non-affluent students on the dependent variable in senior year by each level of campus affluence.

Campus Affluence	Non-Affluent Students	Affluent Students
Less than 37% Affluent	0.40	0.48
37-49% Affluent	0.38	0.48
49-59% Affluent	0.38	0.49
More than 59% Affluent	0.39	0.52

Note: Among all non-affluent students, the mean is 0.39 (SD = 0.29) where N=35,419 from 378 schools (after removing missing data).

We assessed how sensitive the campus affluence effect in the basic model (Table 1 of the paper, column 1) is to the inclusion (and omission) of different control variables. The raw bivariate effect of *More than*

59% affluent (no random effects, year fixed effects, or lagged DV) is b = 0.044; s.e. = 0.005, p < .001. When we include a lagged dependent variable, year fixed effects, and cohort- and school-level random effects, b = 0.024, s.e. = 0.010, p < 0.05, as seen in the table below. These effects are smaller than the effect reported in the main model in Table 1, column 1, so we explore the difference, below.

	Lagged DV
Intercept	0.271***
	(0.009)
Lagged DV	0.472***
	(0.005)
37-49 perc. affluent	-0.010
	(0.008)
49-59 perc. affluent	0.005
	(0.009)
More than 59 perc. affluent	0.024*
	(0.010)
1997	-0.013
	(0.008)
1998	-0.017^{*}
	(0.008)
1999	0.007
	(0.008)
2000	0.005
	(0.008)
2001	-0.001
	(0.008)
AIC	7782.949
BIC	7890.575
Log Likelihood	-3878.475
Deviance	7756.949
Num. obs.	29113
Num. groups: Freshman Cohorts	827
Num. groups: Colleges	359
Variance: Freshman Cohorts (Intercept)	0.000
Variance: Colleges (Intercept)	0.003
Variance: Residual	0.075
*** .0.001 ** .0.01 * .0.05	

^{***}p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05

The addition of any individual-level covariate does not qualitatively alter the size of this coefficient. However, the effect increases once we isolate it from the liberal effects of cohort-level selectivity or a concentration of students attending to gain knowledge, as well as effects from high concentrations of Evangelical or Jewish students. In particular, controlling on either *Proportion High standardized test score* (b = -0.074, p < 0.05) or *Proportion attending to gain knowledge* (b = -0.306, p < 0.001) increases the strength of the affluence effect to 0.035 (p < 0.01) and 0.045 (p < 0.001), respectively. Likewise, controlling on *Proportion Evangelical*, which has a conservative independent effect (b = 0.04, p < 0.001), or *Proportion Jewish*, which has a liberal effect (b = -0.031, p < 0.01), also increases the strength of the campus affluence effect to 0.035 (p < 0.01) in each case. No other covariates substantially alter the size of the campus affluence coefficient when added individually into the basic model.

We conduct a school-level bivariate analysis of the change (from freshman to senior year) in the proportion of affluent student panelists who "disagree strongly" with the taxation question (the most conservative response) regressed on a continuous measure of school-level proportion affluent. School affluence is associated with a greater growth in the proportion of conservative opposition from

freshman to senior year (b = 0.07; s.e. = 0.04). One alternative specification that regresses the senior proportion of those who disagree strongly on school proportion affluent and the freshman proportion yields b = 0.05; s.e. = 0.04. A similar lagged dependent variable model that uses the mean response to the taxation question (instead of the proportion who disagree strongly) yields an effect indistinguishable from zero (b = -0.01; s.e. = 0.03). We also conduct school-level regressions that interact school-level proportion affluent with the proportion who attend school to make money. We find a positive interaction consistent with the individual-level results reported in the paper, but the results are not significant. These school-level analyses are restricted to schools with at least 100 panelists (N = 67).

Local Class Context Analysis

It is possible that the effects we find for campus affluence are either driven by or moderated by the economic context in the area surrounding the campuses. To address this possibility, we account for poverty and income inequality in the county where the campus is located. We measure local inequality using the county-level Gini coefficient and local poverty using the percent of the county population below the poverty line, both with data from the 2000 census. When we include county-level inequality as a predictor, the effect of campus affluence is largely unchanged and retains its significance (based on a comparison of the main model from Table 1 in the paper against SI Table 1, column 1). We take this as evidence that the campus affluence effect is not driven by the level of local inequality. We also observe an absence of significant interaction effects between campus affluence and county-level inequality (SI Table 1, column 2). This suggests that the effect of campus affluence is not significantly moderated by the presence of inequality in the surrounding community. Similarly, when we include county-level poverty as a predictor, the campus affluence effect is largely unchanged and retains its significance (SI Table 1, column 3). We also find no evidence of significant moderation effects (SI Table 1, column 4).

Table 1: Taxing the Wealthy: Local Context Analysis

	County-level Inequality	County-level Inequality	County-level Poverty	County-level Povert
Intercept	0.224**	0.186*	0.243***	0.256***
	(0.083)	(0.093)	(0.069)	(0.069)
Lagged DV	0.462***	0.462***	0.462***	0.462***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
37-49 perc. affluent	0.006	0.159	0.007	0.020
	(0.008)	(0.089)	(0.008)	(0.019)
49-59 perc. affluent	0.028**	0.068	0.029**	0.000
	(0.010)	(0.102)	(0.010)	(0.021)
More than 59 perc. affluent	0.055***	0.124	0.054***	0.045
	(0.012)	(0.110)	(0.012)	(0.023)
County inequality	0.024	0.143	• •	, ,
	(0.108)	(0.155)		
37-49 perc. affluent X County inequality	` ′	-0.343		
		(0.200)		
9-59 perc. affluent X County inequality		-0.092		
		(0.227)		
More than 59 perc. affluent X County inequality		-0.157		
		(0.243)		
County poverty		(/	-0.083	-0.118
J 1			(0.074)	(0.097)
7-49 perc. affluent X County poverty			(0.0.2)	-0.106
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·				(0.136)
9-59 perc. affluent X County poverty				0.241
o oo pere, amaent 11 county poverty				(0.153)
More than 59 perc. affluent X County poverty				0.092
F				(0.165)
Controls Included	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Log Likelihood	-3780.111	-3780.622	-3779.878	-3780.402
Num. obs.	29113	29113	29113	29113
Num. groups: Freshman year cohorts	827	827	827	827
Num. groups: Schools	359	359	359	359

Additional Business Major Analyses

SI Table 2 below provides additional specifications that account for students who intended to or actually majored in business. Column 1 controls on an indicator for cohort-level *High proportion intended business major* in addition to *Intended business major* at the individual level. Columns 2-3 include interactions of individual-level or cohort level intended business majors with campus affluence. Finally, column 4 controls on whether the respondent actually majored in business. There are no interactive effects, and the campus affluence effect remains positive and significant across specifications.


Table 2: Taxing the Wealthy: Additional Business Major Models

	Ind. & Cohort Bus. Maj.	Ind. Interaction	Cohort Interaction	Actual Bus. M
Intercept	0.221**	0.222**	0.222**	0.221**
	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.071)
Lagged DV	0.460***	0.460***	0.460***	0.461***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
37-49 perc. affluent	0.004	0.004	0.005	0.005
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
49-59 perc. affluent	0.024*	0.023*	0.020*	0.019
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
More than 59 perc. affluent	0.046***	0.046***	0.047***	0.043***
-	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.012)
Intended business major	0.056***	0.053***	0.056***	` /
•	(0.005)	(0.011)	(0.005)	
High proportion intended business major	0.010	0.009	-0.009	
<u> </u>	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.030)	
37-49 perc. affluent X Int. bus. major	(01000)	-0.001	(0.000)	
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		(0.015)		
49-59 perc. affluent X Int. bus. major		0.008		
10 00 peres amaene 11 mer babs major		(0.015)		
More than 59 perc. affluent X Int. bus. major		0.003		
more than 50 perc. amaent it into bab. major		(0.013)		
37-49 perc. affluent X High prop. int. bus. major		(0.010)	0.004	
07-45 pere. amaent A mgn prop. mt. bas. major			(0.037)	
49-59 perc. affluent X High prop. int. bus. major			0.040	
49-39 perc. amuent X mgn prop. mt. bus. major			(0.033)	
More than 59 perc. affluent X High prop. int. bus. major			0.009	
wore than 35 perc. amuent X mgn prop. int. bus. major			(0.032)	
Clarent interpretation			(0.032)	0.051***
Changed into business major				(0.007)
Cl				0.036***
Changed from business major				
A1 1				(0.008)
Always business major				0.076***
		**	**	(0.007)
Controls Included	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Log Likelihood	-3585.315	-3595.498	-3591.675	-2916.368
Num. obs.	28319	28319	28319	24046
Num. groups: Freshman year cohorts	823	823	823	805
Num. groups: Schools *** $p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05$	359	359	359	356

Matching

We validate the campus affluence effect using matching. We match individual-level treatment assignment on all of the individual-level covariates in the basic analysis and the year the individual entered college. Table 1 in the main paper presents the genetic matching results (Sekhon 2011), replicated in column 3 (labeled *Genetic*) in the table below. We also validate results with exact and nearest-neighbor methods. For each, we employ the MatchIt program in R (Ho et al. 2011). As an alternative, we also employ genetic matching to match treatment assignment on both individual-level covariates as well as freshman cohort and school-level covariates. These results are presented in the last column of the table below. Genetic matching on only individual-level covariates provides the greatest balance improvement, and we provide the difference-in-means between treatment and control units for all data and the matched data for this method in the figure below. As the figure shows, the matched data are balanced across all individual-level covariates (all difference in means are less than 0.01 on a 0 to 1 scale).

Genetic Matching Covariate Balance



Difference in Means (Treatment - Control)

To estimate the average treatment effects on the treated in the outcome models, we then use an individual-level weighted difference in means using least squares regression, as well as a regression that controls on the full set of covariates at the individual, freshman cohort, and school level and a multilevel model with random intercepts for freshman cohort and school. The table below provides the effects. Positive coefficients represent a conservative effect in line with our hypotheses. We find conservative effects across all specifications. The effect reaches conventional levels of statistical significance for both the weighted difference in means and the regression with full controls. The random effects model estimates produce similar coefficient results, but the standard errors are large.

Method	Exact	Nearest Neighbor	Genetic	Genetic (also matching on covariates at all levels)
Estimate (Bivariate Weighted Least Squares Regression)	0.031***	0.025***	0.034***	0.044***
Std. Error	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(800.0)
Estimate Weighted Least Squares Regression with Controls at each Level) Std. Error	0.050***	0.046***	0.051***	0.065***
	(0.007)	` '	(0.007)	(0.008)
Estimate (Weighted Multilevel Model with Full Controls and Freshman Cohort and School Random Effects)	0.054	0.051	0.050	0.075
Std. Error	(0.065)	(0.061)	(0.068)	(0.058)

Treated Units (All)	11922	11922	11922	11922
Control Units (All)	11641	11641	11641	11641
Treated Units (Matched)	10485	11922	11922	11922
Control Units (Matched)	9639	5342	9921	1934

*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01

Distance from College

We use the distance between a student's permanent home and nearby affluent and non-affluent schools as an instrument to examine the causal effect of school affluence. This must assume that distance is only associated with senior year views through attendance of an affluent school, conditional on covariates. Using two-stage least squares regression, we first regress the treatment (attending a more than 59% affluent school vs. Less than 49% affluent school) on school distance from home along with our exogenous control variables. In the second stage, we then regress our primary dependent variable—views on taxation in senior year—on the instrumented treatment variable and the same exogenous control variables. The first-stage F-statistics are well above 10, suggesting that distance is a sufficiently strong instrument. We find a significant school affluence local average treatment effect on students' views in senior year. (Results available from authors.)

Natural Experiment


We detail the compositional shift experienced at the private school in our within-school analysis. ¹⁸ Comparing the 1992 and 1993 freshman cohorts to the 1996 and 1997 cohorts, we find more than a 10 percentage point decrease in the percent of affluent students at the school (from 55 percent to less than 40 percent) using the 90th percentile threshold for affluence. In addition, we find that the percentage of students reporting Pell grants increases in the non-affluent years at the same time as the proportion of affluent students decreases. Both the median and mean reported parental incomes of the students decrease in the 1996 cohorts. We also observe a decrease in the proportion of affluent students at the school when we use only the single freshman cohort year to aggregate the proportion of affluent students from the full TFS data, as well as when we use alternative thresholds of affluence—the 95th percentile of the national income distribution. The difference in the percent of affluent students between 1993 and 1996 is at least 10 percentage points using any threshold.

In contrast, the school did not change on other covariates in the model. The affluent set of years has a slightly higher proportion of students who attend to gain knowledge and who have higher test scores, but a slightly lower percentage of students with high school GPA of A- or above. The proportion of students who attend to make money is statistically indistinguishable between sets of years. The figure below summarizes the covariate balance.¹⁹

¹⁸ The data access agreement prohibits revealing the identity of this or other schools.

¹⁹ Non-wealthy years also have a slightly more conservative mean cohort opposition to taxation than wealthy years.

Covariate Balance at the Cohort Level Wealthy Years 1992-93 versus Non-Wealthy Years 1996-97



Difference in Means and 95% Confidence Intervals

Cohort Opinion Norm

Cohort Opinion Norm Mediation: Table 6 shows that the effect of attending a campus with more than 59% affluent students is reduced by 78% (from b = 0.055 to b = 0.012) when including the cohort opinion norm in the model. To further explore the extent to which the cohort opinion norm mediates the campus affluence effect, we conduct a formal causal mediation test using the "mediation" package in R that relies on the method described by Imai et al. (2010). First we fit an outcome model with *Opposition to taxation* as the dependent variable and campus affluence and cohort opinion norm as independent variables. We next fit a mediator model where the cohort opinion norm is the dependent variable and campus affluence is the independent variable. The outcome and mediator models both rely on individual-level data, use random effects with random intercepts at the school level only, and contain the standard covariates from the basic model (Table 1, column 1).

This formal mediation test requires a binary or continuous numeric treatment, so to facilitate the test we dichotomize campus affluence in two ways. In the first test, campus affluence is dichotomized to compare the top affluence category ($More\ than\ 59\%\ affluent=1$) with the bottom two affluence categories combined ($Less\ than\ 49\%\ affluent=0$), omitting respondents attending schools between 49-59% affluent. In a second test, campus affluence is dichotomized to compare the top affluence category ($More\ than\ 59\%\ affluent=1$) with the bottom affluence category ($Less\ than\ 37\%\ affluent=0$), omitting

respondents attending schools between 37-59% affluent. Both of these specifications differ somewhat from our main model in that they omit a middle portion of the campus affluence distribution. However, these changes are necessitated by the requirement for a binary or continuous treatment in the R "mediation" package.

The formal mediation tests find as follows:

- When we compare More than 59% affluent to the bottom two categories combined (Less than 49% affluent):
 - Proportion mediated: 36% (p < 0.05); Total effect: 0.032 (p < 0.05); Average Direct Effect:
 0.021 (n.s.)
- When we compare More than 59% affluent to the bottom category (Less than 37% affluent):
 - Proportion mediated: 116% (p < 0.05); Total effect: 0.035 (p < 0.05); Average Direct Effect:
 -0.006 (n.s.)

Across all tests the Average Direct Effect is small and indistinguishable from zero after accounting for the cohort opinion norm. The two formal mediation specifications estimate the campus affluence effect to be mediated by 35.9% or 115.6% (each is significant). We view these as upper and lower limits on the extent to which the cohort norm mediates campus affluence.

Non-Affluent Students: We replicate the cohort opinion norm analysis (Table 6 of the paper) on non-affluent students and find a positive and significant effect (column 1 of SI Table 3 below). Moving from the 10th to 90th percentile of the opinion norm distribution among non-affluent students results in a 0.06 increase in opposition to taxation, which is of similar magnitude to the 0.07 effect on affluent students.

Moderation Effects: We include the cohort opinion norm as a covariate in our moderator models where campus affluence is interacted with the individual-level social embeddedness measure *Joined Greek Life* and cohort measure of the proportion of students attending the school to make money. In columns 2-3 of SI Table 3 we find that the inclusion of the cohort norm does not substantially reduce the interactive effect of *More than 59 perc. Affluent* and social embeddedness relative to Table 5 of the main paper, but does reduce the interactive effect of high campus affluence and high proportion attending to make money by about 40 percent to 0.039 (SE = 0.026).

Table 3: Taxing the Wealthy: Additional Cohort Opinion Norm Models

	Non-Affluent Respondents	Greek Life Interaction	Make Money Interaction
Intercept	0.144**	0.152*	0.166**
	(0.048)	(0.067)	(0.055)
Lagged DV	0.386***	0.458***	0.460***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Cohort Opposition to Taxation	0.330***	0.389***	0.442***
	(0.053)	(0.068)	(0.067)
37-49 perc. affluent	-0.012*	-0.011	-0.002
	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.015)
49-59 perc. affluent	-0.009	-0.002	0.003
	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.018)
More than 59 perc. affluent	-0.022*	0.004	0.020
	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.019)
Joined Greek life		0.019*	
		(0.009)	
37-49 perc. affluent X Joined Greek life		0.022	
		(0.013)	
49-59 perc. affluent X Joined Greek life		0.030*	
		(0.013)	
More than 59 perc. affluent X Joined Greek life		0.040***	
		(0.011)	
58-70 perc. attend to make money			0.029*
			(0.015)
70 perc. attend to make money			0.051***
			(0.015)
37-49 perc. affluent X 58-70 perc. attend to make money			-0.008
			(0.018)
49-59 perc. affluent X 58-70 perc. attend to make money			0.000
			(0.020)
More than 59 perc. affluent X 58-70 perc. attend to make money			-0.014
			(0.018)
37-49 perc. affluent X 70 perc. attend to make money			-0.005
			(0.019)
49-59 perc. affluent X 70 perc. attend to make money			-0.004
			(0.023)
More than 59 perc. affluent X 70 perc. attend to make money			0.039
			(0.026)
Controls Included	Yes	Yes	Yes
Log Likelihood	-3485.400	-3707.301	-3766.797
Num. obs.	35232	29017	29017
Num. groups: Freshman year cohorts	883	821	821
Num. groups: Schools	376	357	357

^{***}p < 0.001, **p < 0.05

Political Discussion

SI Table 4 below examines the effects of including political discussion in our main models, both as a control variable and as an interaction with campus affluence. The question, asked in both the freshman and senior HERI surveys, asks how often students "discussed politics" in the past year. We find that including political discussion as a control (columns 1 and 3) does not alter the effect of campus affluence and that there are no significant interactive effects with campus affluence (columns 2 and 4).

Table 4: Taxing the Wealthy: Political Discussion Models

	Fresh Yr	Fresh Yr	Senior Yr	Senior Yr
Intercept	0.235***	0.238***	0.246***	0.238***
	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.069)
Lagged DV	0.464***	0.464***	0.464***	0.464***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
37-49 perc. affluent	0.007	0.000	0.007	0.017
	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.011)
49-59 perc. affluent	0.030**	0.027*	0.030**	0.035**
	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.013)
More than 59 perc. affluent	0.054***	0.055***	0.054***	0.066***
	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.014)
Political discussion - fresh yr.	-0.006	-0.006	-0.005	-0.005
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
37-49 perc. affluent X Political discussion - fresh yr.		0.013		
		(0.016)		
49-59 perc. affluent X Political discussion - fresh yr.		0.004		
		(0.016)		
More than 59 perc. affluent X Political discussion - fresh yr.		-0.001		
		(0.014)		
Political discussion - senior yr.			-0.033***	-0.017
			(0.005)	(0.012)
37-49 perc. affluent X Political discussion - senior yr.				-0.020
				(0.016)
49-59 perc. affluent X Political discussion - senior yr.				-0.012
				(0.017)
More than 59 perc. affluent X Political discussion - senior yr.				-0.024
				(0.014)
Controls Included	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Log Likelihood	-3701.850	-3711.524	-3683.212	-3691.768
Num. obs.	28785	28785	28785	28785
Num. groups: Freshman year cohorts	827	827	827	827
Num. groups: Schools	359	359	359	359

^{***}p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05

Cross-Class Interaction

SI Table 5 below examines the effects of including cross-class interaction in our College and Beyond model (column 1 of Table 2 in the main paper). Respondents were first asked: "While in undergraduate school, did you get to know any students who were:" ("From a family much *poorer* than yours?"; "From a family much *wealthier* than yours?"). Students who said yes were then asked whether they knew "two or more of these students well while in school" in the respective group. The variables included in this model are dummy variables for knowing two or more poorer students well and two or more wealthier students well. Adding either variable as a control (columns 1 and 3) does not lessen the effect of school affluence²⁰, and there are no significant interactive effects with school affluence (columns 2 and 4).

²⁰ We note that the significant liberalizing effect of knowing two or more "wealthier" students in column 3 is driven by the correlation between being less wealthy and meeting wealthier students. For example, a student in the \$50,000 to \$59,999 category is more likely than a student in the \$150,000 or more category to meet students whom they judge to be "wealthier" than themselves, and is also less likely to

Table 6: Full Version of Main Paper Table 4: Placebo Tests

_	Abortion	Homosexual Relationships	Racial Discrimination	Taxes: Non-Affluent Respondents
Intercept	0.511***	0.508***	0.129**	0.252***
	(0.073)	(0.063)	(0.049)	(0.049)
Lagged DV	0.556***	0.325***	0.240***	0.387***
o= 10	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
37-49 perc. affluent	-0.014	-0.011	0.001	-0.003
10.70	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)
49-59 perc. affluent	-0.017	-0.010	-0.006	0.009
3.5 (1 FO M	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.008)
More than 59 perc. affluent	-0.020	-0.019	-0.002	0.011
Individual Controls	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.010)
High standardized test score	-0.004	-0.032***	0.003	-0.008
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)
High H.S. GPA	0.007	-0.004	-0.004	0.001
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Attend to gain knowledge	-0.012**	-0.024***	-0.024***	-0.011**
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Attend to make money	-0.005	0.009**	0.019***	0.027***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Female	-0.035***	-0.083***	-0.063***	-0.023***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Latino	-0.044***	-0.011	-0.053***	-0.032***
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.007)
Black	-0.047**	-0.005	-0.122***	-0.067***
	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.009)
Other race	-0.025**	-0.004	-0.014*	-0.038***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Evangelical	0.031***	0.062***	0.011*	0.015***
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Jewish	-0.053***	-0.034**	-0.037***	0.017
	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.015)
Other or no religion	-0.051***	-0.024***	-0.012**	-0.015***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Freshman Cohort Controls				
Proportion High standardized test score	-0.018	0.032	0.044	0.071
	(0.047)	(0.039)	(0.029)	(0.038)
Proportion High H.S. GPA	0.007	0.010	-0.017	0.013
	(0.032)	(0.027)	(0.020)	(0.023)
Proportion attending to gain knowledge	-0.358***	-0.364***	-0.045	-0.067
	(0.079)	(0.068)	(0.053)	(0.055)
Proportion attending to make money	-0.065	-0.101*	0.130***	0.073*
	(0.046)	(0.039)	(0.030)	(0.032)
Proportion Latino	0.002	0.017*	0.005	0.014*
	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Proportion other race	0.001	-0.005	-0.008	0.011
	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Proportion Evangelical	0.131***	0.118***	0.030**	0.053***
	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Proportion Jewish	-0.021	-0.005	-0.018*	-0.029**
	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.010)
Proportion other or no religion	-0.034**	-0.012	0.015	-0.008
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.009)
School Controls				
36 (1.6.3)	0.010	0.000	0.000	0.000
Mostly female	0.012	0.003	-0.002	-0.009
	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Mostly Black	-0.047	-0.047	-0.042	-0.030
	(0.033)	(0.028)	(0.023)	(0.020)
Large student body	0.015	-0.003	-0.022*	0.015
D. I.V.	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.011)
Public college or university	-0.036**	0.005	0.013	-0.007
	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.010)
Northeast	-0.014	0.000	0.018**	-0.001
	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.007)
South	-0.027*	0.013	0.018**	0.003
Graduation Year Fixed Effects	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.008)
Graduation real Pixeu Effects				
1997	0.031***	0.007	-0.014*	-0.019**
1997	0.031*** (0.008)	0.007 (0.007)	-0.014^* (0.006)	-0.019** (0.007)
1997 1998				

1999	0.016	0.016*	0.038***	0.012
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.007)
2000	0.017	0.013	0.051***	0.014
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.007)
2001	-0.015	0.004	0.045***	0.002
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.007)
AIC	7939.067	2587.379	-4813.986	7161.689
BIC	8262.393	2910.562	-4490.586	7492.214
Log Likelihood	-3930.534	-1254.689	2445.993	-3541.844
Deviance	7861.067	2509.379	-4891.986	7083.689
Num. obs.	29449	29341	29505	35419
Num. groups: Freshman year cohorts	885	888	883	891
Num. groups: Schools	361	361	360	378
Variance: Freshman year cohorts (Intercept)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Variance: Schools (Intercept)	0.002	0.001	0.000	0.001
Variance: Residual	0.075	0.063	0.049	0.070

^{***}p < 0.001, **p < 0.05

Table 5: Taxing the Wealthy: Cross-Class Interaction Models

	Poorer Med.	Poorer Mod.	Wealthier Med.	Wealthier Mod.
Intercept	0.314***	0.331***	0.333***	0.349***
	(0.078)	(0.081)	(0.083)	(0.088)
50-64 perc. affluent	-0.017	-0.038	-0.009	-0.022
	(0.028)	(0.037)	(0.031)	(0.040)
More than 64 perc. affluent	0.064*	0.036	0.072*	0.040
	(0.030)	(0.038)	(0.034)	(0.045)
Knew 2+ poorer well	0.005	-0.031		
	(0.013)	(0.032)		
50-64 perc. affluent X Knew 2+ poorer well		0.037		
		(0.037)		
More than 64 perc. affluent X Knew 2+ poorer well		0.049		
		(0.037)		
Knew 2+ wealthier well			-0.031*	-0.057
			(0.014)	(0.032)
50-64 perc. affluent X Knew 2+ wealthier well				0.021
				(0.037)
More than 64 perc. affluent X Knew 2+ wealthier well				0.046
				(0.039)
Controls Included	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Log Likelihood	14.211	9.969	16.767	12.506
Num. obs.	1461	1461	1461	1461
Num. groups: Schools	15	15	15	15

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05

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be economically conservative. When we include dummy variables for belonging to each income category above the \$50,000 threshold, the effect of knowing two or more wealthier students becomes insignificant while the effect of attending a school with more than 64% affluent student retains its significance.

Table 7: Full Version of Main Paper Table 5: Social Embeddedness and Financial Gain Interactions

T	Joined Greek Life	Socialize 20+ Hrs per Wk	Cohort Make Money
Intercept	0.264*** (0.067)	0.230*** (0.069)	0.314*** (0.055)
Lagged DV	0.459***	0.461***	0.462***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
37-49 perc. affluent	0.001	-0.002	0.007
40.70	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.016)
49-59 perc. affluent	0.020*	0.020*	0.024
More than 59 perc. affluent	(0.010) $0.042***$	(0.010) 0.048***	(0.019) 0.056**
wore than 60 perc. amuch	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.020)
Greek life	0.020*	,	,
	(0.009)		
Frequent socializer		-0.013	
58-70 perc. Attend to Make Money		(0.009)	0.021
oo to pero intend to make money			(0.016)
70 perc. or More Attend to Make Money			0.046**
			(0.016)
37-49 perc. affluent X Greek life	0.022		
40.50 M + V.C. 1.25	(0.013)		
49-59 perc. affluent X Greek life	0.033* (0.014)		
More than 59 perc. affluent X Greek life	0.042***		
niore than 50 perci amacin ir Greek me	(0.011)		
37-49 perc. affluent X Frequent socializer	,	0.028*	
		(0.013)	
49-59 perc. affluent X Frequent socializer		0.029*	
Many than 50 and affirm V Francis and alice		$(0.013) \\ 0.025^*$	
More than 59 perc. affluent X Frequent socializer		(0.011)	
37-49 perc. affluent X 58-70 perc. Att.Make Money		(0.011)	0.001
			(0.019)
49-59 perc. affluent X 58-70 perc. Att. Make Money			0.008
			(0.021)
More than 59 perc. affluent X 58-70 perc. Att. to Make Money			-0.006
37-49 perc. affluent X 70 perc. or More Att. Make Money			(0.019) -0.001
of 10 peror diffusion 11 to peror of finete from finding			(0.020)
49-59 perc. affluent X 70 perc. or More Att.Make Money			-0.000
			(0.024)
More than 59 perc. affluent X 70 perc. or More Att. Make Money			0.066*
Individual Controls			(0.029)
			+ + +
High standardized test score	-0.016** (0.005)	-0.018^{***} (0.005)	-0.019*** (0.005)
High H.S. GPA	-0.013***	-0.013***	-0.014^{***}
11.51 11.51 51.11	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Attend to gain knowledge	-0.021***	-0.022***	-0.021***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Attend to make money	0.037***	0.039***	0.039***
Female	(0.003) $-0.011**$	$(0.003) \\ -0.009**$	(0.003) $-0.010**$
Tentale	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Hispanic	-0.040**	-0.042**	-0.043**
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Black	-0.082***	-0.085***	-0.083***
0.1	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Other race	-0.032*** (0.008)	-0.033*** (0.008)	-0.035*** (0.008)
Evangelical	0.005	0.004	0.003
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Jewish	-0.003	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Other or no religion	-0.030*** (0.005)	-0.034*** (0.005)	-0.034*** (0.005)
Freshman Cohort Controls	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
T	0.067	0.046	0.062
Proportion High standardized test score		(0.042)	(0.042)
	(0.041)		(0.042)
Proportion High standardized test score Proportion High H.S. GPA	-0.008	0.014	0.013

Proportion attending to make money	0.115**	0.148***	
	(0.042)	(0.043)	
Proportion Latino	0.025**	0.024**	0.022^{*}
 	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Proportion other race	-0.003	-0.008	-0.006
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Proportion Evangelical	0.078***	0.079***	0.074***
F	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)
Proportion Jewish	-0.004	0.002	0.002
1 toportion townsh	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Proportion other or no religion	-0.006	-0.005	-0.007
1 toportion other of no rengion	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)
School Controls	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)
School Controls			
Mostly female	0.023	0.015	0.017
niobily londer	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Mostly Black	-0.060	-0.065*	-0.060*
niobily Black	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.030)
Large student body	0.001	-0.001	-0.007
Zaigo bradoni body	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Public college or university	0.005	0.003	0.010
Tuble college of university	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)
Northeast	-0.019*	-0.024**	-0.025**
11010110400	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
South	-0.010	-0.005	-0.004
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Graduation Year Fixed Effects	(0.010)	(0.020)	(0.020)
1997	-0.015	-0.017^{*}	-0.017^*
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
1998	-0.026**	-0.027***	-0.029***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
1999	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
2000	0.005	0.001	0.002
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
2001	-0.002	-0.004	-0.005
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
AIC	7547.399	7552.564	7681.202
BIC	7903.393	7908.167	8062.033
Log Likelihood	-3730.699	-3733.282	-3794.601
Num. obs.	29113	28849	29113
Num. groups: Freshman year cohorts	827	826	827
Num. groups: Schools	359	358	359
Variance: Freshman year cohorts (Intercept)	0.000	0.000	0.000
Variance: Schools (Intercept)	0.001	0.001	0.001
Variance: Residual	0.074	0.075	0.075
*** $n < 0.001$ ** $n < 0.05$	0.0.1	0.0.0	0.0.0

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05

Table 8: Full Version of Main Paper Table 6: Opinion Norm Mediation

	Lagrand DV	Cohort Lagrad DV
Intercept	Lagged DV 0.234***	Cohort Lagged DV 0.100
	(0.068)	(0.067)
${\rm Lagged~DV}$	0.462***	0.460***
37-49 perc. affluent	(0.005) 0.007	$(0.005) \\ -0.008$
37-49 perc. amuent	(0.008)	(0.008)
49-59 perc. affluent	0.029**	0.002
	(0.010)	(0.010)
More than 59 perc. affluent	0.055***	0.012
Cohoot one orition to touching	(0.012)	(0.013) $0.447***$
Cohort opposition to taxation		(0.068)
Individual Controls		(3 2 2 3)
High standardized test score	-0.019***	-0.019***
High H.S. GPA	(0.005) $-0.014***$	(0.005) $-0.014***$
nigli n.s. GFA	(0.004)	(0.004)
Attend to gain knowledge	-0.021***	-0.021***
	(0.004)	(0.004)
Attend to make money	0.039***	0.039***
T	(0.003)	(0.003)
Female	-0.010** (0.003)	-0.010** (0.003)
Latino	-0.042**	-0.043**
	(0.013)	(0.013)
Black	-0.083***	-0.082***
	(0.016)	(0.016)
Other race	-0.034***	-0.034***
Evangelical	(0.008) 0.003	(0.008) 0.002
Evangencar	(0.007)	(0.002)
Jewish	-0.002	-0.001
	(0.012)	(0.012)
Other or no religion	-0.033***	-0.033***
Freshman Cohort Controls	(0.005)	(0.005)
Proportion High standardized test score	0.050	0.059
	(0.042)	(0.038)
Proportion High H.S. GPA	0.012	0.011
Proportion attending to gain knowledge	(0.029) -0.074	$(0.027) \\ -0.074$
r roportion attending to gain knowledge	(0.075)	(0.069)
Proportion attending to make money	0.146***	0.136***
	(0.043)	(0.040)
Proportion Latino	0.024**	0.014
	(0.009)	(0.008)
Proportion other race	-0.007	-0.008
Proportion Evangelical	(0.009) 0.079***	(0.009) 0.048***
1 Toportion Evangences	(0.014)	(0.014)
Proportion Jewish	0.001	-0.001
	(0.011)	(0.010)
Proportion other or no religion	-0.006	0.006
School Controls	(0.012)	(0.011)
Mostly female	0.017	0.025
Mostly: Plack	(0.018) $-0.067*$	(0.017)
Mostly Black	-0.067 (0.031)	0.005 (0.031)
Large student body	-0.001	-0.007
	(0.013)	(0.012)
Public college or university	0.004	0.016
27	(0.013)	(0.012)
Northeast	-0.022* (0.009)	-0.007
South	(0.009) -0.005	$(0.008) \\ -0.003$
	(0.010)	(0.009)
Graduation Year Fixed Effects	()	(/
1007	c ~-*	0.00***
1997	-0.017*	-0.025**
	(0.008)	(0.008)

1998	-0.028***	-0.049***
	(0.008)	(0.009)
1999	-0.001	-0.033***
	(0.009)	(0.010)
2000	0.002	-0.035***
	(0.009)	(0.010)
2001	-0.004	-0.042***
	(0.009)	(0.010)
AIC	7635.655	7581.264
BIC	7958.534	7912.290
Log Likelihood	-3778.828	-3750.632
Deviance	7557.655	7501.264
Num. obs.	29113	29017
Num. groups: Freshman year cohorts	827	821
Num. groups: Schools	359	357
Variance: Freshman year cohorts (Intercept)	0.000	0.000
Variance: Schools (Intercept)	0.001	0.001
Variance: Residual	0.075	0.075

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05